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Cooperative Tax Regulation
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.
This Article describes a new approach to tax regulation based on
cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence. Currently,
tax regulation in the United States relies too heavily on sticks and not
enough on carrots. While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the
law in the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article
optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other
things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their
advisors in a participatory process, and appreciating the elegant power of
cognitive devices that portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than
nonpayment of taxes as a penalty. Even with optimal penalties, tax
officials cannot currently enforce the law effectively due to severe resource
and information asymmetries.
To overcome these debilitating
shortcomings, the government must improve funding, recruiting, training,
and retention. It must also partner with taxpayers and practitioners to
strengthen detection, enforcement, and prosecution of abusive tax
avoidance. Cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not
only in taxpaying but also in tax advising and tax administration.
Ultimately, it can produce a regulatory environment of collaboration
rather than adversity, ex ante resolution rather than ex post controversy,
and certainty rather than secrecy.
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Cooperative Tax Regulation
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2006, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it
failed to collect as much as $353 billion in taxes owed for tax year 2001.1
The “tax gap,” the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what
they pay on a timely basis, reflected a compliance rate of 83.7%.2
Congress reacted strongly. Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) called the tax
avoidance unpatriotic and responsible for the federal deficit. “When
people and companies . . . don’t pay their taxes, the burden for paying this
country’s expenses falls even more heavily on Americans who do their
duty every April 15.”3 It was the government’s obligation “to go after
scofflaws and tax cheats big and small, who are contributing to the deficit
by not contributing their fair share.”4 Baucus and others urged the Bush
administration to move aggressively,5 and to rework preliminary proposals
which were forecast to net $3.5 billion over ten years, just one-tenth of one

∗
Acting Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I thank Ellen Aprill, Jonathan Baker,
Steven Bank, Joseph Bankman, Mortimer Caplin, Susan Carle, Michelle Kane, Leandra Lederman,
Edward McCaffery, Andrew Pike, Deborah Schenk, William Simon, Jay Soled, and Kirk Stark. I also
thank a number of individuals in private law practice, none of whom disclosed client confidences nor
discussed specific transactions, as well as several government tax officials, none of whom disclosed
taxpayer information. In addition, I benefited from comments received at the Advanced Topics in
Taxation Colloquium at Northwestern School of Law, the Critical Tax Theory Conference at UCLA
School of Law, the Junior Tax Scholars Workshop at Boston University School of Law, and the
Washington College of Law Junior Faculty Workshop.
1
IRS News Release IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=154496,00.html.
2
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy Eric Solomon Before the Senate Finance Committee on Ways to Reduce the Tax Gap (Apr.
18, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp360.htm.
3
Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus Calls New Tax Gap Numbers “Unacceptable,” Calls
for Bolder IRS Action to Collect Taxes Owed (2006) [hereinafter Baucus Press Release], available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/prb021406a.pdf; see also GSA Contractors Who
Cheat on Their Taxes and What Should Be Done About It: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigation, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-MI) (“[W]hen so many
Americans fail to pay the taxes that they owe, it begins to undermine the fairness of our tax system,
forcing honest taxpayers to make up the shortfall needed to pay for basic federal protections.”).
4
Baucus Press Release, supra note 3.
5
See, e.g., Memorandum, Sen. Charles Grassley, Tax Gap Numbers (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg02106b.pdf; Stephen Joyce, Everson Urges Fiscal 2008
Request Approval; Conrad Calls Tax Gap Proposals ‘Too Modest’, 31 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1
(Feb. 15, 2007) (quoting Sen. Kent Conrad, D-ND, demanding a “far more aggressive approach” to
close the tax gap).
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percent of the estimated $3.5 trillion tax gap.
A slew of recommendations sprung forth. The Bush administration
offered sixteen new legislative proposals7 to implement the Treasury
Department’s “comprehensive, integrated, multi-year strategy” to close the
tax gap.8 At the same time, legislators introduced more than a dozen tax
gap bills.9 Closing the gap became a priority for the IRS10 and a bipartisan
issue for Congress.11 The revenue to be gained from closing the tax gap
was “low-hanging fruit,” according to Charles Rangel (D-NY).12 It could
eliminate the deficit,13 pay for revising the Alternative Minimum Tax,14
and reform the health care system.15
Meanwhile, a minority warned against viewing the tax gap as a
policymaking panacea. Charles Grassley (R-IA) noted that politicians had
already begun to see the tax gap as “one of those magic elixirs” for all
fiscal problems, so much so that he expressed feigned surprise that “folks
don’t think the tax gap can cure baldness.”16 The Treasury Department had
estimated that 54% of the gap involved noncompliance where there was
little or no third-party reporting of a taxpayer’s liability.17 Noncompliance
for rents and royalties, for instance, equaled 51%, for non-farm proprietor
6
The Tax Gap and How to Solve It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong.
(2006) (written testimony of Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner).
7
See Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2008
Revenue Proposals, at 63–82 (2007) [hereinafter Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations],
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk07.pdf.
8
IRS, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving Voluntary Compliance, at 3 (2007)
[hereinafter Reducing the Federal Tax Gap], available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=
172790,00.html.
9
A list of the bills is on file with the Author.
10
See IRS Oversight Board Annual Report, at 4, 19 (2006) (identifying the tax gap as a primary
concern for tax year 2007).
11
See, e.g., Kurt Ritterpusch, Rangel Says Forging Bipartisan Alliances Will Be Priority Over
AMT, Tax Gap Issues, 224 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Nov. 21, 2006) (describing consensus to
close the gap).
12
Kurt Ritterpusch, Post-Election Action on Closing Tax Gap Deemed Common Ground Issue for
Congress, 208 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 27, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13
See e.g., Letter from Sens. Evan Bayh, Ron Wyden, Charles E. Schumer, Barack Obama, to
IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson, (Jan. 19, 2007), available at 7 TAXCORE (BNA) 15 (Jan. 24,
2007) (explaining that closing the tax gap could “eliminate the unified budget deficit”); Drew Douglas,
Treasury 2008 Budget Plan to Include Renewed Focus on Compliance, Tax Gap, 13 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA), at G-2 (Jan. 22, 2007) (discussing tax gap proposals to reduce the deficit).
14
Ritterpusch, supra note 12 (discussing how Rangel viewed the tax gap as a way to pay for
AMT reform).
15
119 CONG. REC. S3058 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-IA)
(noting that many members of Congress perceive the tax gap as a “cure all,” and as a way to expand
spending on health care).
16
Id.; see also Examining the Administration’s Plan for Reducing the Tax Gap: What Are the
Goals, Benchmarks, and Timetables?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (Apr. 18,
2007) (opening statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I’m worried that some members have their head in the
clouds when it comes to the tax gap. Some members view the tax gap as money in the pocket to spend
on favorite proposals. Nothing could be further from the truth.”).
17
IRS, Tax Gap Figures, at 3 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_
figures.pdf.
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income, 57%, and for farm income, an astounding 72%.
Meanwhile,
compliance rates for income subject to automatic withholding (wages and
salaries) and information reporting (interest and dividend income) hovered
around 99 and 95%, respectively.19 Proceeding on the assumption that
people pay taxes only when they have to, and that increased enforcement
by itself was not an effective alternative,20 the majority of tax gap
proposals expanded information reporting.21 But this approach barely
dented the $353 billion shortfall.22 In addition to yielding too little
revenue, critics charged that the approach threatened taxpayer privacy,
burdened taxpayers with excessive compliance costs, and tipped the
regulatory balance decidedly away from taxpayer service.23
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the “low-hanging fruit”
has already been picked by withholding and information reporting regimes.
It is other forms of income—some perched on upper branches, some
hidden from view at the subterranean level—that continue to elude tax
officials. Capturing this income and reducing the massive avoidance of
taxes in a meaningful way requires a multifaceted approach to a difficult
problem that only seems to be getting worse.24 The government has three
18

Id. at 2.
See id. For the influence of these reporting regimes on tax compliance, see Leandra Lederman,
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–
99 (2007); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 972–76
(2003).
20
The Treasury Department has concluded that enforcement by itself cannot close the gap,
because: (i) much of the tax gap is due to forms of unreported income that are difficult to detect (i.e., no
third-party reporting); (ii) even if detected, tax liability might be uncollectible (due to difficulties in
locating the taxpayer or taxpayer insolvency); and (iii) many detected liabilities are so small that it is
not cost effective to pursue collection. JAMES M. BICKLEY, TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT, CRS
REPORT, at 4 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33882_20070216.pdf.
21
See Diane Freda, Information Reporting Proposals May Become Congressional Revenue
Raisers, IRPAC Says, 206 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-1 (Oct. 25, 2007) (describing efforts to
increase reporting).
22
Nearly 98% of the estimated increase in compliance receipts from the administration’s tax gap
recommendations relied on improved information reporting, which were estimated to generate only
$29.5 billion over ten years, not quite 1% of the estimated gap. See Dep’t of the Treasury, General
Explanations, supra note 7, at 120–21.
23
See, e.g., SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, CLOSING THE TAX GAP: NOT THE ‘POT OF
GOLD’ THAT SOME HOPE TO DISCOVER 1 (2007), http://rpc.senate.gov/public/_files/031307TaxGapSN
.pdf (stating that the administration’s proposals were overly intrusive, adversely altered the relationship
between the government and the taxpayer, and insufficiently accounted for “taxpayers dignity, privacy,
and their loss of time due to compliance requirements”); Internal Revenue Service FY 2008 Budget
Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Services and Gen. Gov’t, S. Appropriations Comm.,
109th Cong. 4 (2007), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_05_09_
Testimony_of_Nina_Olson_at_the_May_9_Financial_Services_and_General_Government_Subcommit
tee_Hearing.pdf?CFID=40356114&CFTOKEN=32695686 (written statement of Nina E. Olson,
National Taxpayer Advocate) (noting that under the administration plan, “the IRS would be spending
literally twice as much on enforcement as it spends on taxpayer service”).
24
The tax gap for 1973 amounted to $28.8 billion, IRS News Release, IRS Sees A Large and
Growing Tax Gap, 20 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (1983), reflecting 91.2% compliance, Daniel Bernick,
Treasury, Practitioners Assess Prospects in Compliance Area, 20 TAX NOTES 101, 101 (1983),
compared to 83.7% compliance for 2001. See supra note 2. Moreover, assuming that the tax gap
19
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choices. It can continue picking away at the far fringes of the tax gap. It
can impose draconian measures of coercive enforcement, for which there is
no political will, nor any good argument even if there were.25 Or it can
consider the virtues of cooperative tax regulation.
This Article describes these virtues and articulates an approach to tax
regulation based on cooperation, information sharing, and interest
convergence. It argues that closing the tax gap requires a relational rather
than a coercive tax compliance norm. Such a norm necessitates that tax
regulators nurture compliance with both sweeter carrots and sharper sticks.
A compliance equilibrium based on reciprocity rather than adversity
provides positive incentives for taxpayers and tax regulators to trade
secrecy for certainty. Under a cooperative model, taxpayers and their
advisors enjoy certainty of outcome with respect to tax reporting positions
and fewer post-filing challenges. At the same time, the government is in a
better position to identify emerging taxpayer issues and compliance risks,
and to shift limited resources from post-filing controversies to other areas
of service and enforcement. Such an exchange relationship, characterized
by dialogue and transparency, seeks to forge a shared understanding of
what it means to comply with the tax law. By no means does the
cooperative approach outlined in this Article reject penalties or
enforcement as part of an overall compliance strategy. To the contrary, it
recognizes explicitly that taxpayers will comply with the law in the
presence of effective deterrence and enforcement.26 But it also recognizes
that penalties alone and aggressive enforcement will not necessarily
improve compliance, and may actually worsen it.27 The challenge for tax
officials under the cooperative model “is to play a two-handed game: To
deal with the wrongdoing today, while nurturing consent for tomorrow.”28
A cooperative rather than an adversarial compliance norm may appear
grows in proportion to increased tax liability, the $353 billion gap for 2001 is equivalent to $400 billion
for 2006. ERIC TODER, URBAN INST. AND URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., REDUCING THE TAX
GAP: THE ILLUSION OF PAIN-FREE DEFICIT REDUCTION 1 (2007), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/411496_reducing_tax_gap_revised.pdf.
25
See Joyce, supra note 5, at G-1 (quoting Commissioner Everson as saying, “[t]o reduce the tax
gap dramatically would take some draconian steps, ones that would fundamentally change the
relationship between taxpayers and the IRS, require unacceptably high commitment of enforcement
resources, and risk imposing unacceptable burdens on compliant taxpayers”); Reducing the Federal
Tax Gap, supra note 8, at 18 (“[W]hile it may be possible to take action to reduce the tax gap, it is not
possible to implement a policy that eliminates the tax gap without an unacceptable change in the
fundamental nature of the current tax compliance system.”).
26
See Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance,
in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 15–17 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (arguing
that enforcement provides taxpayers with an extrinsic motivation to comply with tax laws); see also
infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
27
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
28
Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-compliant
Actions, in TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 15, 35 (Valerie
Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter TAXING DEMOCRACY].

2008]

COOPERATIVE TAX REGULATION

437

inapposite in the tax context. After all, the goals of taxpayers and their
advisors on the one hand and tax regulators on the other are largely
adverse, with taxpayers trying to reduce and avoid taxes at the same time
that tax regulators try to collect them. This Article argues that the interests
of taxpayers and tax authorities are not all that dissimilar, particularly once
we start thinking of taxpayers as interested partners in the regulatory effort
and tax advisors as compliance counselors.29 From this perspective,
paying one’s taxes yields tangible benefits beyond penalty avoidance,
while advising taxpayer clients resembles the work performed by securities
lawyers; the compliance norm is not “do you have a plausible explanation
for your position,” but rather “does your position reinforce the public
purposes of the law.” Tax officials also must adopt new perspectives
under the cooperative model. If we make taxpayers, in the words of
Justice Holmes, “turn square corners” when dealing with the government,30
it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a similar
standard of “rectangular rectitude” when dealing with its taxpayercitizens.31 Cooperative tax regulation requires tax authorities to assist
taxpayers, share information with them, and respond to their concerns.
The regulatory model articulated in this Article adopts an approach
reflected in the “new governance” and “responsive regulation” literatures.
New governance involves “a shift in emphasis away from command-andcontrol in favour of ‘regulatory’ approaches which are less rigid, less
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in
nature.”32 Responsive regulation, for its part, emphasizes a dynamic, nonadversarial approach where regulators assist regulated actors in complying
with the law, and where regulated actors, as reward for their cooperation,
assist regulators in crafting the regulatory environment.33 Scholars have
29

Legal scholar Robert Gordon has advocated a similar shift in thinking among corporate
lawyers. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
30
Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
31
John MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson’s Choice and Similar Practices in Federal
Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1299 (1935).
32
Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AND THE US 2, (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). The most recognizable American
scholar associated with the new governance approach is William Simon. See William H. Simon,
Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in id. at 37–38; William H. Simon,
After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2006) [hereinafter Simon, After Confidentiality]. New governance
shares an intellectual heritage with the more ubiquitous “democratic institutionalism.” See, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 469–73 (1998) (proposing a new form of government, “democratization, through
experimentalist connection,” in which power is decentralized, information is pooled, and subnational
units of government are free to set and attain their own goals).
33
See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DE-REGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE
REGULATION (2002).
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begun to apply the responsive regulation model to tax. According to its
most prolific proponent, Australian tax scholar Valerie Braithwaite, “[t]he
traditional tax infrastructure of law, auditors, penalties, debt collectors, and
court cases needs to be supplemented by measures that boost taxpayers’
commitment to paying tax with or without the tax authority watching over
their shoulders.”35 This Article applies these regulatory approaches to U.S.
tax regulation, particularly the corresponding virtues of an exchange
relationship under which all parties—tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax
practitioners—commit to transparency and information sharing, and where
the government rewards compliance with leniency, flexible
accommodation, and an opportunity to shape legal rules.
The Article proceeds in four sections. Part II applies the cooperative
model to the existing tax penalty regime. While strict tax penalties
typically embody the failed command-and-control approach to regulation,
an effective compliance strategy requires regulatory sticks. Thus, Part II
looks beyond the traditional economic deterrence model for tax penalties
and explores non-economic motivations for complying with tax laws to
help re-conceive the penalty regime. It recommends an interactive
approach to tax regulation that rewards compliance with restraint,
assistance, opportunities to participate in the rulemaking process, and even
tax rebates. Part II also emphasizes that the government must act swiftly
and effectively against intransigent noncompliance which, unchecked,
undermines the cooperative model.
Part III challenges tax regulators to improve enforcement (which
includes much more than penalties) as well as customer service. Like the
rest of the Article, Part III argues that people will comply with the law if
the law uses effective and fair mechanisms of deterrence, enforcement,
prosecution, and punishment. On the enforcement side, Part III proposes
increasing the number and thoroughness of audits, shrinking the “resource
gap” and “information gap” that currently separates government lawyers
from private sector lawyers, and facilitating private enforcement of tax
laws. On the service side, it emphasizes a cultural shift in tax
administration from command-and-control to collaboration, from ex post
controversy to ex ante resolution, and from regulatory intimidation to
procedural fairness.
Part IV examines the woefully deficient professional standards
currently governing tax practitioners. It argues that weak regulation of tax
practice by the professional associations—particularly the American Bar
Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants—
34
See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW &
POL’Y 1 (2007).
35
Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note
28, at 1.

2008]

COOPERATIVE TAX REGULATION

439

has enabled tax avoidance. Moreover, it commends recent efforts by
Congress and the Treasury Department to elevate ethical guidelines for tax
practitioners. Finally, it recommends a set of substantive legal rules and
disclosure requirements designed to improve tax compliance by making
tax planning and tax reporting more transparent.
As part of the effort to enhance compliance through increased
transparency, tax officials need at their disposal a judicious mix of rules
and standards. Part V discusses how rules provide certainty of outcome
and lower compliance costs, as well as enhanced due process and fair
treatment. It also shows how standards provide coherence to a set of
otherwise independent rules by giving them overarching purpose. Part V
roots this discussion in an examination of the Treasury Department’s
regulations governing tax practice. It explores the extent to which the
combination of disciplinary rules and aspirational standards contained in
the regulations both reflect and conflict with cooperative tax regulation.
II. RE-CONCEIVING THE PENALTY REGIME
Taxpayers comply with the law when they think the law will be
enforced. Indeed, taxpayer behavior depends largely “[on] the government
itself,”36 both the fairness of its processes37 and its willingness to enforce
the law effectively and to prosecute wrongdoers.38 Heavy-handed attempts
at enforcement by regulators can backfire, however, resulting in less rather
than more compliance.39 The difficulty for tax authorities is crafting a
regulatory regime that uses sticks as effectively as carrots.
Historically, the primary enforcement mechanism for U.S. tax officials
has been a penalty regime based on an economic deterrence model of
detection and punishment. The basic idea behind the economic model is
that people respond rationally to maximize expected gain and to minimize
expected loss. Thus, to deter non-compliance, regulators raise the
magnitude of penalties or the probability of detection. The problem for tax
officials is that for penalties to effectively deter non-compliance under the
rational economic model, penalty rates would have to be raised to
unrealistically high levels. If we assume an audit rate of 2%, twice the
level of the current rate,40 and we further assume that the IRS always (and
36

McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 17.
See Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 ECON.
GOVERNANCE 87 (2002) (arguing that a tax authority’s legitimacy depends on fair procedures of tax
collection and enforcement).
38
See Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 77, 91 (Valerie Braithwaite
& Margaret Levi eds., 1998) (writing that “the willingness to pay taxes quasi-voluntarily or to give
one’s contingent consent to conscription often rests on the existence of the state’s capacity and
demonstrated readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise noncompliant”).
39
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
40
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
37
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only) catches noncompliance on audit (another optimistic assumption), the
penalty rate sufficient to deter underpayment would have to equal 4900%
of tax due.41 Suffice it to say, the economic deterrence model is incapable
of curbing noncompliance by itself.
While the motivations underlying tax compliance undoubtedly include
economic considerations, rationality involves more than economic inputs.
A tax penalty regime that appreciates these other incentives would
recognize moral, ethical, and social considerations for paying taxes, and it
would view tax penalties as more than punitive instruments. A regime that
merely punishes wrongdoers creates an adversarial environment and
compliance norm. By comparison, a cooperative tax penalty regime
reflects collaborative norms, whereby taxpayers and tax regulators work
together, and where taxpayer compliance is rewarded with leniency,
technical assistance, and opportunities to participate in the development of
legal rules. A cooperative regime must also be able to identify
noncompliant behavior, and respond to intransigent noncompliance with
escalating sanctions and intervention, which, if ignored, would undermine
the cooperative model. To the extent positive incentives do not sufficiently
facilitate compliance among recalcitrant tax avoiders, tax authorities
should consider no-fault penalties. The imposition of a strict-liability
penalty could drastically alter the taxpaying calculus, adding significant
risk to overaggressive tax positions and transactions.
A.

From Economic Deterrence to Cooperative Regulation: Sweeter
Carrots, Sharper Sticks

Modern discussions of economic deterrence trace their roots to
economist Gary Becker’s influential work in the 1960s and 1970s on the
relationship between crime and penalties, both real and perceived.42
Becker’s economic theory of crime restated the goal of penalties as the
internalization of the social costs of offenses, rather than the elimination of
pain. In the early 1970s, economists Michael Allingham and Agnar
Sandmo extended Becker’s general theory of deterrence to tax compliance,
and argued that the degree of deterrence, calculated as the product of the
probability of detection and the size of the penalty, determines the amount
of income evaded for any particular taxpayer.43 For the next decade,
41
The relevant formula can be expressed as P = (1 - d) / d, where P is the penalty per dollar of
underpayment, and d is the probability of detection. This example is admittedly stylistic, and assumes
that the 2% audit rate is completely random, rather than correlating with potential tax-shelter
participants. In addition, the computation fails to account for the probability of conviction in addition
to detection.
42
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
169–72 (1968) (developing an economic model for understanding the relationship between crime and
punishment).
43
Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J.
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researchers employed increasingly sophisticated economic models, trading
varying degrees of punishment and deterrence to locate the optimal tax
compliance package.
Researchers found that maximizing economic gain or minimizing
economic loss could not fully explain why people comply with the law;
real-world penalty rates were simply too low to explain the relatively high
rates of compliance.44 It became clear that compliance was not only about
risk aversion, and that the economic analysis of deterrence over-simplified
why people pay taxes by ignoring other explanatory variables.45
Researchers were forced to conclude that models associated with economic
theories of tax compliance provided, at best, “tentative guidance . . . in
well-specified circumstances.”46 It is worth examining briefly the findings
to evaluate the role economic deterrence can still play in a re-imagined
penalty regime.
Survey research predicts a positive impact of deterrence on avoidance
and evasion with higher fines and higher rates of enforcement.47 Empirical
research reveals more ambiguity, with some studies reporting a positive
impact of penalties on compliance,48 and others reporting a positive impact
of higher probability of detection.49 Researchers examining both fines and
probability of detection report a positive but small impact on compliance,50
PUB. ECON. 323, 324 (1972).
44
See James Alm et al., Why Do People Pay Taxes? 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 36 (1992) (finding that
individuals “often pay more in taxes than a simple application of expected utility theory would
suggest”).
45
See id.; Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Facts and
Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 357 (1985) (criticizing the application of the economics of crime
methodology to tax evasion and avoidance).
46
John Creedy, Tax Modeling, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: INTRODUCTORY
SURVEYS IN ECONOMICS 133, 135–36 (John Creedy ed., 2001).
47
See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); James
Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 841 (1998) (“[H]igher penalties and audit
probabilities discourage cheating.”).
48
See, e.g., James Alm et al., Economic and Non-Economic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48
KYKLOS 3, 12 (1995) (“When the fine rate increases, the number of individuals at zero compliance falls
greatly, and the number at full compliance rises accordingly.”); Ana De Juan et al., Voluntary Tax
Compliant Behavior of Spanish Income Taxpayers, 49 PUB. FIN. (SUPP). 90, 97 (1994); Steven Klepper
& Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution,
23 LAW & SOC. REV. 209, 238–39 (1989).
49
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax
Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 61, 61 (1988); Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., Are We a Nation of
Tax Cheaters?: New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 241 (1987)
(“[A]n exogenous increase in the probability of detection and conviction or in the penalty rate will
increase compliance.”); A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 879 (1998); Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased
Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455,
456–57 (2001) (finding that “treatment effect varies depending on the level of income” and that “[t]he
effect was much stronger for those with more ‘opportunity’ to evade”).
50
See, e.g., James Alm et al., Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311, 322–23 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“[C]ompliance . . . rises when the audit rate
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while other researchers have generated ambiguous results as to the effect
of fines and detection.51 In fact, some studies report a “crowding out” of
tax compliance when penalties are introduced with a corresponding
increase in evasion.52
If we believe that taxpayers, even perfectly rational, utility-maximizing
taxpayers, care about considerations beyond narrowly defined economic
self-interest, it should come as no surprise that penalties can lower rather
than raise compliance. Thirty years of research has demonstrated that
deterring noncompliant behavior is not entirely about economic selfinterest or subjective probabilities of detection that merely augment the
standard economic model.53 Rather, regulating tax compliance involves
considerations extending beyond economics, and while some of these
motivations can be reduced to monetary values, others cannot. A growing
number of researchers have shown that moral, ethical, and social factors—
more than threats of economic or legal punishment—determine whether
and how taxpayers comply with the law.54 Similar considerations might
even dissuade tax professionals from advising overaggressive planning
strategies.55 At the very least, thirty-five years after Allingham and
increases. However, the differences in compliance rates . . . are not large.”); Dick J. Hessing et al.,
Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and
Experimental Studies, in id. 291, 292 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
51
See, e.g., Hank Elffers et al., The Consequences of Different Strategies for Measuring Tax
Evasion Behavior, 8 J. ECON. PSYCH. 311, 324 (1987); Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a
Function of the Quality of Information About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some
Preliminary Research, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 54, 55 (1982); Kimberly N. Varma & Anthony N.
Doob, Deterring Economic Crimes: The Case of Tax Evasion, 40 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 165, 165–66
(1998).
52
The basic idea behind this finding is that taxpayers balance extrinsic motivations for paying
taxes (i.e., penalties and enforcement) with intrinsic motivations (i.e., individual framing decisions such
as feelings of civic virtue and desires to avoid shame and stigma), and that raising extrinsic motivations
may fail to compensate for the corresponding incursion on intrinsic motivations. Braithwaite, supra
note 28, at 34–35; Doreen McBarnet, When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 229; Bruno S. Frey,
A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1044–46 (1997); Mark Lubell
& John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI.
160, 173–75 (2001).
53
Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis 8–11
(CESifo Working Paper No. 760, 2002).
54
See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance?: Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 126–28 (2001); Brian Erard &
Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49
PUB. FIN. (SUPP.) 70, 74–77 (1994); Josef Falkinger, Tax Evasion, Consumption of Public Goods, and
Fairness, 16 J. ECON. PSYCH. 63, 63 (1995); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal
Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 863, 865–69 (2004); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement
in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459–62 (2003); Laurie Mason & Robert L. Mason, A
Moral Appeal for Taxpayer Compliance: The Case for a Mass Media Campaign, 14 LAW & POL’Y
381, 381–82 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1782 (2000).
55
See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 97–98 (2001) (stressing the importance of appealing
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Sandmo animated the discussion of why people pay (and don’t pay) taxes,
there is a consensus that moral, ethical, and social strategies can and should
complement traditional punishment and deterrence strategies.
A number of recent proposals for reforming the penalty regime
account for multiple taxpaying motivations. None of them reject
altogether the economic deterrence model, and some offer sophisticated
refinements whereby rational taxpayers consider avoidance and evasion
strategies based on expected rather than nominal sanctions.56 These
proposals build on considerations that previous researchers may have noted
but either assumed away or failed to explore fully, such as how noneconomic and extra-economic motivations interact with the standard
economic model. As importantly, they provide strategies for restructuring
the tax penalty regime to reflect cooperative tax regulation.
Restructuring the penalty regime to recognize multiple taxpaying
motivations requires acknowledging the power of social norms. These
legally unenforceable rules of behavior operate beyond the reach of the
current tax penalty system. Aggressive taxpayers and their advisors,
moreover, have captured the power of social norms to the detriment of the
tax system and other taxpayers57 by engaging in “norm-based tax
planning,” the tacit, informal understandings that reduce tax liabilities and
create tax-shifting distortions.58
Though social norms can undermine the tax system, they can also
reinforce it. In fact, tax compliance norms shared by tax decision-makers
at large public corporations have had a positive impact on compliance in
recent years. These norms have produced “general liability concerns
within organizations” from the corporate taxpayer, outside legal counsel,

to lawyers’ conscience rather than self-interest as a way to stop the use of abusive tax shelters); Tanina
Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. REG.
77, 81 (2006) (arguing that elite corporate lawyers and the tax bar supported recent changes to
professional standards due to a “nuanced conception of professionalism”).
56
E.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (introducing a self-adjusting penalty equal to the
fraction of legitimately claimed subtractions to income reported on the same line containing illegitimate
subtractions to income); David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 358, 368 (2006)
(calling on Congress to raise “marginal deterrence” and increase sanctions on practitioners by having
them bear part of the understatement penalty “when a deal they blessed is successfully challenged”).
57
Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
601 (2007).
58
Raskolnikov elegantly discusses several examples of informal tax-driven norms, including
arrangements associated with the hedging strategy known as variable delivery prepaid forward
contracts, id. at 613–16, loan tranches, id. at 616–18, and the relationship between equity swaps and
notional principle contracts, id. at 618–20. Other scholars warn that tax rules by themselves are
incapable of altering industry norms. E.g., Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1228–30 (2004) (finding that statutory tax law has historically failed to
alter norms of corporate behavior with respect to cash retention policies and corporate reorganizations);
Kirsch, supra note 54, at 916–21 (demonstrating the ineffectiveness of tax provisions designed to
reduce tax-motivated expatriations).
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59

and accounting firms. According to law professor Susan Morse, these tax
compliance norms developed as a result of enforcement efforts “wholly
unrelated to tax,”60 and were instead the product of statutory changes to
disclosure and governance procedures for corporations.61 The tax
compliance norm that Morse identifies, as well as the organizational and
group dynamics that she describes,62 suggest that government efforts
designed explicitly to facilitate tax compliance may have an even more
powerful effect on tax decision-makers within corporations and on outside
tax advisors. Given Morse’s findings, for instance, recent Treasury
regulations establishing vicarious liability for tax practitioners responsible
for overseeing a firm’s tax practice may have already altered risk and
liability concerns within firms and among advisors.63
Self-interest is never far from the surface, a reality that can help as
much as hinder efforts to forge cooperative tax regulation. To level the
playing field on which taxpayers and tax regulators play, for instance, tax
scholar David Schizer recommends asking private lawyers “to help the
government in a way that also helps their clients.”64 Schizer envisions a
partnership between taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax authorities that would
raise compliance by explicitly rewarding compliant behavior. Selfinterested incentives for assisting reform could involve narrowing
overbroad anti-abuse rules;65 rewarding lawyers and law firms that issue
conservative opinions by granting them leeway in the examination
process;66 expediting the revenue ruling and pre-filing processes for
conservative lawyers;67 and further bolstering the reputation of
conservative advisors by publishing a list of deviant practitioners.68 If just
a few of the players privy to the “common knowledge of tax abuse”69
withdrew from the game, the stakes would go down (or up, as it were), as
former participants partnered with the government—again, if only for self59
Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 964 (2006).
60
Id.
61
For fuller discussion of the changes, see infra notes 265–72 and accompanying text.
62
See Morse, supra note 59, at 984–94.
63
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.36 (2007) (subjecting to discipline practitioners with principal
authority for overseeing a firm’s tax practice for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent behavior not
in compliance with federal regulations).
64
Schizer, supra note 56, at 333.
65
Id. at 357–58. For discussion of anti-abuse rules, see infra notes 280–86 and accompanying
text.
66
See Schizer, supra note 56, at 361–62 (“Lawyers will want conservative reputations, and clients
will want to hire such lawyers, if the government treats opinions of conservative lawyers more
favorably than opinions of aggressive ones.”).
67
Id. at 362.
68
See id. (“[T]he government . . . [could] keep a list of aggressive advisors.”). In 2008, the IRS
began posting on its website final disciplinary decisions for violations of Treasury regulations
governing standards of tax practice by tax practitioners. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
69
Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 131 (2001).
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interested reasons—armed with enough knowledge and market power to
undermine Gresham’s Law.70 Moreover, if former participants blew the
whistle on tax cheats, perhaps lured by the financial bounties offered under
the redesigned IRS whistleblower program,71 government interests and tax
practitioner interests would be further aligned.
A number of commentators extend the partnership model even more
explicitly to cultivate cooperative behavior among taxpayers and tax
advisors. These voices call for more responsive regulation in broadening
the definition of deterrence to include “measures that nurture the social
responsibility and ethics of taxpayers,” and that embrace “a dynamic
framework” reflecting “the interplay of the taxpayer/tax-authority
interaction.”72 An expanded conception of deterrence borrows from the
“general prevention” approach in the literature on crime, and, according to
legal scholar Sagit Leviner, is designed to improve compliance “not only
by means of curbing illegal activity but also by encouraging legal behavior,
such as by balancing authoritarian deterrence with positive encouragement
and assistance.”73 Taxpayer cooperation could be further induced with a
mix of cognitive tricks that exploit taxpayers’ preference for policies
described as bonuses rather than their punitive opposites, such as offering
tax rebates for filing taxes on time and without subsequent errors.74 Under
the partnership model, tax regulators extend to taxpayers “cooperation,
positive and helpful service, and open dialogue as a first response to
conflicts.”75 If a taxpayer refuses the initial offer of cooperation, tax
regulators would respond firmly but fairly, slowly ratcheting up
enforcement to encourage compliance while continuing to offer
70
“Gresham’s Law” refers to bad money driving out good money. In the context of tax practice,
Gresham’s Law refers to “bad” or “low-minded” tax advisors driving out “good” or “public-minded”
tax advisors.
71
See infra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.
72
Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to Responsive Regulation,
1500 IRS RES. BULL.: RECENT RES. ON TAX ADMIN. & COMPLIANCE 241, 271–72 (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/productsandpubs/article/0,,id=151642,00.html (follow “A New Era of Tax
Enforcement: From ‘Big Stick’ to Reponsive [sic] Regulation” hyperlink); see also Braithwaite, supra
note 35, at 3–5 (suggesting responsive regulation should be applied to the tax system); Braithwaite,
supra note 28, at 15, 35 (arguing for a dynamic approach to containing tax avoidance problems); Lars
P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of
Incentives and Responsive Regulation 3, 6, 17, 19–20 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of
Zurich, Working Paper No. 287, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900366 (commenting on
the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities).
73
Leviner, supra note 72, at 255–56.
74
The cognitive trick here involves describing payment of taxes as a bonus rather than
nonpayment of taxes as a penalty. The field of behavioral economics has long recognized the centrality
of “framing” on decision-making and expressed preferences. Researchers have begun to demonstrate
the relevance of framing to tax compliance. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron,
Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 679 (2004); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues:
Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 230, 232, 241 (2003).
75
Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.

446

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:431

cooperation as a reward. By “genuinely rewarding taxpayers in an
exchange relationship,” economists Lars Feld and Bruno Frey suggest, tax
regulators can increase tax compliance by improving “tax morale.”76 More
than a partnership, the taxpayer and tax regulator enter into a
“psychological tax contract” that, like other contracts, involves reciprocal
rights and duties.77 The psychological tax contract requires taxpayers and
tax regulators to “treat each other like partners . . . with mutual respect and
honesty” throughout the planning, auditing, and litigation stages of the
relationship.78
Lest this partnership mentality conjure images of holding hands and
singing “Kumbaya” around the campfire, it is imperative to place it in the
context of give-and-take tax regulation. Substituting a shared governance
equilibrium for an adversarial equilibrium necessarily requires that
regulators and taxpayers work together in ways previously unimagined. A
partnership mentality does not necessarily equate with lax enforcement or
insufficient consequences for noncompliant behavior. Indeed, according to
Dave Hartnett, Director General of the United Kingdom’s HMRC (Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Custom, formerly, Inland Revenue), initiatives in
Great Britain aimed at fostering a collaborative compliance norm have
successfully avoided creating an environment where tax regulators are
“pink and fluffy and only supportive.”79 British officials have been “very
demanding of business and those who advise them,” requiring heightened,
timely disclosures to help “make the system work.”80 The reciprocal
exchange provides taxpayers more certainty, while the government
receives valuable information about taxpaying behavior. In addition, the
information gleaned from the partnership model of tax regulation can assist
tax officials in better distinguishing between compliant and noncompliant
taxpayers.81 Current evaders and aggressive avoiders may still engage in
noncompliant behavior in the presence of the partnership model. But the
76
Feld & Frey, supra note 72, at 20. For earlier research on the relationship between tax morale
and tax compliance, see John G. Cullis & Alan Lewis, Why People Pay Taxes: From a Conventional
Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 305, 310 (1997), and Benno
Torgler, Tax Morale and Direct Democracy, 21 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 525, 525–26, 530 (2005).
77
Feld & Frey, supra note 72, at 20.
78
Id. at 4; see also Braithwaite, supra note 28, at 17 (stating that while tax authorities may have
legal legitimacy, that authority “does not guarantee them psychological legitimacy,” a pre-requisite for
long-term compliance).
79
Mark A. Weinberger et al., Keynote Panel: Is the Global Wave of Change in Tax Risk Over or
Just Beginning?, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 38 (remarks of Dave Hartnett, Director General,
Compliance Strategy & Business, HM Revenue & Customs).
80
Id.
81
Increased information could also buttress other signaling techniques (such as which auditors or
lawyers taxpayers use) that might be integrated into existing IRS programs that classify taxpayer
behavior into different categories. See Stephen Joyce, LMSB Launches Issues Classification System to
Promote Consistency, Cut Currency Time, 48 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-2 (Mar. 13, 2007)
(discussing the IRS “industry issue focus” approach, a tiered classification system that categorizes
compliance issues across industry lines).
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feedback provided by a reciprocal approach can help tax authorities
identify noncompliant taxpayers and respond with harsher penalties,
aggressive enforcement, regular audits, and ongoing monitoring.82
A cooperative model for tax regulation might still appear vulnerable to
“agency capture.” Under this theory, regulators fail to uphold the broader
public interest by falling prey to the influence of powerful regulated
entities which substitute their own self-serving agenda for the public policy
agenda.83 Scholars have identified various federal agencies as victims of
capture, including the Federal Aviation Administration (by the airline
industry),84 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (by nuclear power
companies),85 the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food, Safety, and
Inspection Service (by meat and processed foods industries),86 and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (by the National Rifle
Association).87
To date, no one has suggested that the IRS is particularly susceptible to
agency capture. While it is true that inviting taxpayer input during
rulemaking lacks the tension among competing public interests that exists
in other regulatory contexts,88 it seems likely the IRS will remain immune
to agency capture. Unlike other agencies, the Service does not interact as
82
See Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements: The FASB, SEC and IRS Current Perspectives
and Future, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 58 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, Commissioner, Large
and Mid-Size Business Division, IRS) (noting that increased information would help tax officials “treat
taxpayers commensurate with their behavior”).
83
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (defining the capture hypothesis); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682–83 (1975) (summarizing capture theory
by writing, “[t]o the extent that belief in an objective ‘public interest’ remains, the agencies are accused
of subverting it in favor of the private interests of regulated and client firms”); see also Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2000) (describing the “deep
interdependence among public and private actors in accomplishing the business of governance”); John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986)
(attributing the shift in antitrust doctrine toward wider application of federal policy to the evolution of
agency capture theory). For critiques of capture theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12, 37 (1991) (challenging the prevailing view
of the influence of special interests); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 497–98 (1999) (characterizing capture theory as “imprecise and
controversial”); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97, 104–05 (2000) (suggesting that “this dim view of agency independence is due in part to a
combination of the methodological imperatives of public choice scholarship and social scientists’
desire to avoid normative issues”).
84
Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381
(2002).
85
Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (1999).
86
Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 142 (1998).
87
Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis,
32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000).
88
Unlike environmental regulatory rulemaking, for instance, where interest groups align on both
sides of issues, few taxpayers align on the side of the IRS.
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intimately with the entities it regulates. Moreover, it does not oversee one
particular industry with organized representation, but instead regulates
hundreds of millions of taxpayers in hundreds of thousands of different
taxable industries, thereby diffusing the potential influence of specific
interest groups.89 In addition, the IRS does not engage in traditional
“negotiated rulemaking,” where regulated entities “establish privately
bargained interests as the source of putative public law.”90 Comparatively,
the IRS, somewhat perfunctorily, meets the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act,91 publishing notices of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, and inviting interested parties to
comment. Far from producing undue influence, the process can result in
taxpayers, practitioner groups, industry representatives, and trade
associations feeling powerless in determining policy outcomes.92 Inviting
taxpayer input early in the rulemaking process invests taxpayers and their
advisors in the regulatory effort, and helps overcome feelings of
helplessness and distrust.
Cooperative tax regulation operates within a framework of governance
in which traditional criticisms of agency regulation are inappropriate. The
cooperative model emphasizes flexible not rigid regulatory approaches,
creative not static outcomes, fluidity rather than hierarchy. This dialectic
approach achieves a balance of persuasion and punishment that “prevents
the emergence of widespread taxpayer resistance and fosters goodwill and
cooperation.”93 Moreover, this model is particularly well-suited to tax,
where compliance is not always in the interest of taxpayers (especially in
the short-term), and where the probability of detection is nearly an
irrelevant consideration given current levels of enforcement.94
B. Regulatory Sticks and No-Fault Penalties in an Uncertain World
Notwithstanding the significant potential of the cooperative model, tax
regulation in the United States continues to emphasize punishment and
deterrence. Recent changes to the penalty regime, moreover, have been
89
For a similar argument that agencies working across industries are less likely to be captured,
see generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003);
Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN L.
REV. 859 (1997).
90
William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997).
91
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1995) (defining entities subject to the Act and the requirements
governing their rulemaking).
92
To the extent capture theory infects tax regulation, it does so at the legislative rather than the
administrative level. For a particularly colorful story of tax politics at the legislative level, see
generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
93
Leviner, supra note 72, at 263.
94
See infra Part III.A (discussing the debilitating resource and information gaps).
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largely punitive rather than persuasive. In 2004, Congress passed the
American Jobs Creation Act (Jobs Act),95 which heightened reporting and
disclosure requirements96 for “reportable transactions,”97 tax code speak for
“tax shelters.”98 As an incentive to disclose information with respect to
tax-motivated transactions, Congress significantly raised existing penalties
while also adding new ones, only a few of which rewarded disclosure with
penalty avoidance or lower penalty rates.99 In addition, legislators set more
stringent requirements for asserting a defense for engaging in reportable
transactions,100 making it available only in the presence of adequate
disclosure,101 substantial authority,102 and a reasonable belief that the
position was “more likely than not” correct.103 Moreover, the Jobs Act
authorized the Treasury Department to impose stringent monetary penalties
on practitioners and firms for violating the new reporting obligations.104 In
particular, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility may now levy
95
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
96
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111–12, 6662A, 6707, 6707A (Supp. 2005). Congress replaced the former
registration and list maintenance rules with new rules requiring “material advisors” to disclose
reportable transactions and maintain detailed lists of investors. See id. § 6111 (material advisor
reporting requirement); id. § 6112 (material advisor list maintenance requirement).
97
A “reportable transaction” is the tax code’s term of art for prohibited tax shelter transactions.
The tax code defines reportable transactions generally as “of a type which the Secretary determines as
having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.” Id. § 6707A(c)(1). Meanwhile, Treas. Reg. § 1.60114(b)(2) (2007) specifies particular prohibitive transactions, including: (i) “listed” transactions that have
a “significant tax avoidance purpose,” see id. § 301.6111-2(b)(2), and are the same as, or substantially
similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Treasury as a tax avoidance transaction; (ii)
“confidential” transactions in which the advisor imposes a condition of confidentiality to protect the
advisor’s planning strategy; (iii) transactions in which the advisor’s fee is contingent on the success of
the planning strategy; (iv) “loss” transactions in which a gross loss exceeds certain thresholds; and (v)
“transactions of interest” that have the potential for abuse, but for which the Treasury lacks sufficient
information to determine whether they should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.
98
Several I.R.C. provisions still refer to “tax shelters” rather than “reportable transactions,” and
continue to define the former as a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or
any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of federal income
tax. E.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2) (2008).
99
See I.R.C. § 6700 (2000) (raising the shelter organizer penalty for a false statement from $1000
to 50% of gross income derived from the activity); id. § 6707 (increasing the penalty for failure to
register a tax shelter transaction from $500 to $50,000 for reportable transactions other than listed
transactions and up to 75% of gross income derived from the activity for listed transactions); id. §
6707A (creating a new taxpayer penalty for failure to disclose a reportable transaction); id. § 6708
(establishing a new penalty which replaced the $50 penalty for failure to maintain investor lists under §
6112 with a $10,000 per day penalty for failure to turn over information upon request from the IRS); id.
§ 6662A (creating a new taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions, increased to
30% if not disclosed).
100
See id. § 6664(d) (2000) (establishing exceptions for reportable transaction understatements).
101
Id. § 6664(d)(2)(A); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(c)(2), 1.6662-4(e), (f) (2008) (indicating
the methods for making adequate disclosures).
102
I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2008) (defining the substantial
authority standard and method for determining whether it has been met).
103
I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(C)see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) (describing when a
taxpayer is within reason to believe that the tax treatment of an item is more likely than not correct).
104
See infra notes 303–30 and accompanying text (discussing the penalties for practitioners and
firms).
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steep monetary sanctions (that can amount to double the expected fees
charged for advising a reportable transaction) either in addition to or in lieu
of other sanctions that may be levied, including censure, suspension, or
disbarment.105 New rules governing tax practice reinforce the reporting
requirements by mandating that practitioners affirmatively disclose
transactions, via written opinions that fail to meet the elevated more likely
than not standard.106 In 2006, the Treasury Department issued additional
reporting requirements for an entirely new category of deals called
“transactions of interest,” which Treasury feels have the potential for abuse
but for which it lacks sufficient information to determine whether the deals
should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.107
Though these changes to the tax compliance regime reflect a typical
command-and-control style of regulation, they appropriately address
longstanding information asymmetries separating taxpayers and tax
regulators.108 Like similar efforts to impose transparency in the corporate
governance context—with, for instance, disclosure rules under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act109 and the establishment of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board110—heightened enforcement and disclosure in
the tax context can also increase transparency. In turn, such transparency
can facilitate certainty in reporting positions, and reduce costs of
compliance as well as enforcement. Indeed, whether through “forced”
transparency in the form of more threatening penalties, categories of
prohibited transactions, and heightened disclosure rules or through
“induced” transparency in the form of various pre-filing alternative dispute
resolution initiatives,111 openness can lead to certainty for both taxpayers
and the government.
In addition, stiffer penalties and disclosure
obligations send overt signals to taxpayers and their advisors that the
government is serious about enforcing the law and prosecuting violators.
When it is clear that the government means business, researchers have
105

31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2007).
Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i).
107
AJCA Modifications to the Section 6011 Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,488 (Nov. 2, 2006) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 25, 31, 53, 54 and 56). In September 2007, the IRS specified the
first two such transactions. See Notice 2007-72, 2007-36 I.R.B. 544 (indicating that as of August 14,
2007, a Contribution of Successor Member Interest would be considered a transaction of interest);
Notice 2007-73, 2007-36 I.R.B. 545 (indicating that as of August 14, 2007, a Toggling Grantor Trust
would be considered a transaction of interest).
108
See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1348–51 (2000) (discussing the several advantages taxpayers and
tax lawyers have over the government); see also infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text (arguing
that even if resources were allocated more evenly, there would still be an “information gap” between
taxpayers and the government).
109
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
110
15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19 (2000) (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
and defining its rules and procedures).
111
See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing pre-filing initiatives).
106
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shown that taxpayers are more likely to comply with the law. This does
not mean that tax regulators can rely exclusively on ramping up
enforcement while ignoring service, information sharing, and cooperation.
It does mean, however, that recent legislative changes to the penalty and
disclosure regimes, by providing the IRS a fuller array of sticks and
carrots, might induce taxpayers and their advisors to cooperate in a
reciprocal tax regulatory environment.
In the event these incentives fail to alter the behavior of particularly
intransigent taxpayers, the government should have at its disposal another
policy option: a no-fault, strict-liability underpayment penalty. Under this
approach, reasonableness and good faith do not provide a defense to
challenged taxpayer positions,113 and legal opinions do not provide penalty
protection for taxpayers. In the current world of tax compliance, where
state of mind determines culpability, and where legal uncertainty lowers
still further the chance a taxpayer will be found culpable (to say nothing of
low audit rates that virtually assure asserted positions go unexamined by
the government),114 the taxpayer has almost no reason to adopt a
conservative approach when choosing between transactions. However, in
a world where state of mind does not absolve the taxpayer, and where
stricter disclosure rules (even for non-controversial positions) help
counteract low audit rates, taxpayers might think twice before choosing
overaggressive transactions.115 Of course, taxpayers may still assert
overaggressive positions. But they will have to consider the heightened
risk before doing so.
No-fault penalties are not unprecedented. In fact, the U.S. tax code
currently uses several of them, though they are targeted to certain
taxpayers and certain kinds of behavior.116 Furthermore, as law professor
Daniel Shaviro has noted, once we acknowledge that taxpayers already
respond strategically to the legal uncertainty surrounding tax law, “no-fault
penalties should not even be controversial” because taxpayers will account

112
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (indicating that taxpayer behavior is influenced
by the perception of whether the government will enforce the law).
113
For current treatment respecting penalty abatement, see IRC § 6664(d) (2000) (reducing §
6662A penalty pertaining to accuracy-related understatements on reportable transactions “if it is shown
that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect
to such portion”); id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (reducing the substantial understatement penalty for
understatements pertaining to tax return positions that are adequately disclosed and that possess a
reasonable basis of being upheld upon challenge).
114
For a fuller discussion, see infra notes 125–43 and accompanying text.
115
See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to
Corporate Tax Shelters 4–5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Center for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No.
07-05, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 (discussing why tax penalties “need not
have anything to do with wrongdoing”).
116
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662(e), (h) (imposing no-fault penalties on certain transfer-pricing
transactions).
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for them like other compliance inputs.
Imposing penalties on all
taxpayers based purely on objective criteria and without regard to state of
mind might be susceptible to charges of procedural unfairness depending
on how the rules are written. To mitigate such concerns, Congress could
require the government to pay for the taxpayer’s time and expense if it
challenges a position and loses. Moreover, taxpayers could protect
themselves against the risk of future penalties by turning to the thriving tax
insurance industry.118
Opponents of a no-fault penalty might still object to the approach
given the inherently stochastic nature of tax law. More so than other areas
of the law, tax rules often provide no clear law at all, whereby the law
itself becomes a random variable, with a certain probability that it is X and
a certain probability that it is Y. Add the difficulty of assigning particular
probabilities to different outcomes—in addition to the fact that regulators
and courts can express preferences for form, substance, or any point in
between—and making risk assessments becomes a task of partially
informed guesswork. In a world of such uncertainty, disclosure rather than
substantive regulation may be the preferred course.
The next two sections of the Article address the difficulty of locating
certainty in tax law. Part III discusses ways for taxpayers and tax officials
to enjoy greater certainty through information sharing, collaboration, and
pre-filing resolution rather than post-filing controversy. Moreover, it puts
the government in a better position to act on the information it receives by
increasing resources in the form of money, personnel, and expertise. Part
III also explores various policy opportunities for bringing private
enforcement to tax law as a way of adding risk of detection and
prosecution to the compliance calculus, and aligning taxpayers on the side
of tax collection rather than tax avoidance. Part IV takes the contingent
nature of tax as given, but rejects the usual conclusion that legal
uncertainty justifies nearly any transaction. Instead, it posits a stricter
rather than more lax level of certainty that practitioners and taxpayers must
reach before reporting tax positions. It also recommends broader
disclosure rules, both to assist the government in cracking down on
overaggressive behavior and to provide taxpayers a procedure to assert
aggressive positions. A combination of heightened practice standards and
disclosure rules can alter compliance norms by adding yet another element
of risk to the taxpayer’s evaluation of whether and how to comply with the
law.
117

Shaviro, supra note 115, at 45.
See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV.
339, 387–95 (2005) (describing a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax indemnity
insurance or transactional tax risk insurance, that provides coverage against the IRS disallowing a
taxpayer-insured’s treatment of a particular transaction).
118
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III. IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT, IMPROVING SERVICE
Improving enforcement alongside service requires balancing
regulatory sticks and carrots. It entails enhancing the government’s ability
to enforce the nation’s tax laws through increased resources and relevant
taxpayer information. In some respects, improving enforcement requires
making the government a better adversary. But creating a better adversary
in the context of cooperative tax regulation appreciates that effective
enforcement embraces transparency. In this way, enforcement spills over
into service, with the government creating a regulatory culture that seeks to
understand and inculcate the interests of taxpayers. Traditional regulatory
models emphasizing post-filing controversy give way to pre-filing
information sharing and issue resolution. The collaborative exchange, in
turn, yields greater certainty of outcome for taxpayers and greater certainty
of behavior for tax regulators. Moreover, it mitigates the mutual suspicion
that currently separates taxpayers and tax regulators, and that contributes to
flagging compliance. The IRS has begun to recognize the benefits of the
cooperative approach, “establishing an environment where collaboration is
priority one,”119 and “reducing noncompliance while ensuring fairness,
observing taxpayer rights, and reducing the burden on taxpayers who
comply.”120 Part III of the Article provides specific recommendations to
further mobilize a cooperative regulatory environment, and to equip the
government with the necessary tools to work collaboratively with
taxpayers.
A. Closing the Resource and Information Gaps
In 1998, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act121 prompted a radical
reshuffling of resources and a shift from enforcement to customer service
that was arguably long overdue. Congress recognized that taxpayer
perceptions of the system’s procedural fairness played an integral role in
tax compliance. But politicians overreacted. The IRS “may have made
mistakes,” former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin has said of the
1998 reforms, “but they were not malicious or systemic.”122 The
crackdown on the IRS forced the agency to cut employees, reduce the
number and thoroughness of audits, and slash enforcement appropriations
all in the name of customer service.
119
Drew Douglas, IRS to Focus on Service, Enforcement, Technology to Close Tax Gap, Officials
Say, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 23, 2007) (quoting Linda Stiff, acting Commissioner of
Internal Revenue).
120
Reducing the Federal Tax Gap, supra note 8, at 57.
121
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112
Stat. 685 (1998).
122
Mortimer M. Caplin, The Tax Lawyer’s Role in the Way the American Tax System Works, 106
TAX NOTES 697, 699 (2005).
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In recent years, the IRS has begun to recalibrate the scales. IRS Chief
Counsel Donald Korb has said that while the pendulum swung “way too
far” in the direction of service in the 1990s, it is swinging back toward
enforcement as the IRS attempts “to get to equilibrium.”123 Former
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson echoed Korb’s remarks,
noting that a “rebalance has been struck between service and enforcement”
but not at the expense of service, which, according to Everson, has also
improved.124
A renewed focus on enforcement appears to have paid dividends.
Between 2002 and 2007, enforcement revenues rose an astounding 73%,
from $34.1 billion to $59.2 billion.125 Moreover, between 2000 and 2007,
the audit rate for individual taxpayers jumped from an all-time low of
0.49% to a more respectable 1.03%,126 while for high-income individuals
(defined as persons earning more than $100,000), the audit rate steadily
increased between 2001 and 2005, with tax year 2005 boasting the highest
number of reviews since 1995.127 Furthermore, in 2007, the government
audited a full 7% more total individual taxpayers (1.3 million versus 1.2
million), including an amazing 84% increase for taxpayers earning more
than $1 million.128
These numbers are misleading, however. While absolute dollar
amounts from enforcement have increased, the IRS has left a significant
amount of money on the table. The Service audited 45% fewer total
companies between 1998 and 2007.129 For every category of business
taxpayer—small business, large corporation, and tax-exempt—the IRS
performed fewer audits in 2006 than in 1997.130 Moreover, although
collections in 2007 increased 22% over the previous year, both the number
of delinquent taxpayers (866,777) and the amount owed on unassigned
collection cases ($34.9 billion) hit 10-year highs.131 In addition, the IRS
has begun allocating fewer hours to each audit,132 relying increasingly on
123
Alison Bennett, Korb Defends Aggressive Shelter Approach; Vows to Help Efforts to Reach
“Equilibrium,” DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 13, 2006).
124
William H. Carlile, Tax Compliance Environment Improved, IRS Commissioner Tells TEI
Conference, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 24, 2006).
125
IRS, IRS Statement on Fiscal Year 2007 Enforcement, with Statistics, Enforcement Revenue
Chart, TAXCORE (BNA) No. 12 (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement].
126
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REFERENCE NO. 2008-30-095,
TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 45 (2008) [hereinafter TIGTA],
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200830095fr.pdf.
127
IRS News Release, supra note 1.
128
IRS Statement on FY 2007 Enforcement, supra note 125.
129
TIGTA, supra note 126, at 9.
130
Stephen Joyce, IRS to Continue Tax Compliance Push; Effect on Audits, Planning Uncertain,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at S-11 (Jan. 16, 2007).
131
TIGTA, supra note 126, at 5.
132
See Alison Bennett, TRAC Asserts ‘Historic Collapse in Audits’; Shott Says Interpretation of
Data Is Wrong, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-10 (Apr. 15, 2008); Stephen Joyce, TRAC Says IRS
Spends Less Time on Audits: IRS Says Worker Gains Mean More Revenue, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at
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“correspondence” audits (i.e., mail audits), which are less effective than inperson audits at detecting underreporting by high-income taxpayers.133
Revenue agents also spent 40% more time in 2006 than in 2001 conducting
“no-change audits” that resulted in no additional tax assessment
recommendations.134 There have even been reports that the Service has
pressured agents to prematurely close audits of large corporations as part
of negotiated compromises.135
The audit rate itself belies improved enforcement. In 2007, the IRS
audited only slightly more than 1% of all individual returns,136 a marked
improvement in the short term,137 but far below historical averages. Even
then, the IRS could not verify all positions embedded in examined
returns.138 The other 99% of the time, the opposing party’s assertions went
unexamined and unchallenged. The IRS may have even less luck
enforcing the tax laws on businesses, despite higher absolute audit rates.
In 2007, exams of companies with assets exceeding $10 million decreased
to 16.8%,139 while audits of companies with assets of more than $250
million dropped to roughly 30%.140 Even for corporations subject to
annual audit, there is no guarantee the Service will identify questionable
transactions, either because of gaps in the corporate taxpayer’s records,141
concealment of impermissible transactions,142 or the practice of allowing
corporations to set the audit agenda and include for examination
conservative transactions while obscuring or omitting aggressive
transactions.143
Viewed historically, the modern Internal Revenue Service is a shadow
G-8 (Dec. 21, 2006) (reporting twenty percent decline in cycle time spent on large corporate audits
between 2002 and 2006).
133
Allen Kenney, TIGTA Finds Audit-by-Mail More Common Than IRS Says, 115 TAX NOTES
TODAY 219 (2007); see also TIGTA, supra note 126, at 8 (reporting that almost 83% of all
examinations of individual taxpayers in 2007 were correspondence examinations).
134
Stephen Joyce, TRAC Says IRS Time on No-Change Audits Up; IRS Defends Practices, Cites
Improvement, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-7 (Apr. 13, 2007).
135
David Cay Johnston, Agents Say Fast Audits Hurt I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at C1,
available at Lexis, News Library, NYT File.
136
TIGTA, supra note 126, at 45.
137
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
138
See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We
Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 189 (1996) (writing that even if the IRS audits a
taxpayer, “it may not notice whatever tax evasion the taxpayer may have engaged in”).
139
TIGTA, supra note 126, at 45.
140
Id. at 9. According to some observers, the audit rate for these companies may be even lower.
See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Audits of Largest Corporations Slide to All
Time Low (2008), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/current/ (citing a twenty-six
percent audit rate).
141
See Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 189.
142
See Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 100 (1994)
(finding that businesses conceal tax-motivated transactions from auditors).
143
See 1 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST
PROVISIONS, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING
AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 223 (1999).
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of its former self. During the “golden age” of the IRS in the 1960s, audit
levels approached an astonishing 6%.144 The Service recruited young
lawyers from top law schools, entry-level salaries for government lawyers
competed with private-sector wages, and IRS employees garnered respect
from taxpayers, practitioners, and politicians. In every category, the
golden years are a distant memory. Audit levels have fallen to 1%; newlyminted Harvard law graduates choose Wall Street firms with $160,000
starting salaries and $30,000 bonuses over positions at the IRS for onefourth to one-third the remuneration; and the status attributed to working
for the IRS has yet to recover from the “disasters” of the late 1990s.145 It is
fair to say that the modern IRS strikes fear only in the hearts of the meek.
Compared to its main competitor, the private tax bar, the Service is
short money, personnel, and expertise.146 The first two deficiencies go
hand in hand. Between 1998 and 2007, funding for IRS personnel fell
dramatically, resulting in a 23% decline in combined collection and
examination function enforcement staff.147 Moreover, between 1996 and
2003, the number of revenue officers and revenue agents—two groups
critical to detecting noncompliance—declined by 40% and 50%,
respectively.148 Overall, the IRS workforce shrunk by nearly 15,000
employees from 2002 to 2008.149 Meanwhile, IRS workload jumped
sharply. The number of taxpayers filing returns grew from 123 million in
1998 to 138 million in 2007, with more complicated returns—such as
Schedule C returns—doubling the growth rate of aggregate individual
returns.150
Shortfalls in expertise are harder to quantify. But discussions with
leading tax practitioners suggest that this component of the “resource gap”
is an even larger problem than personnel and funding issues.151 One
144
A sizeable though unquantifiable portion of the declining audit rate is attributable to the
computerization of tax administration, with computer matching performing much of what audits
accomplished in the 1960s. This Article does not endorse raising audit rates to reflect historically high
levels, and it recognizes that we cannot “audit our way out of the tax gap” to achieve optimal
compliance. Alison Bennett, Solomon Previews Major Guidance, Outlines Concerns on Tax Gap,
Economic Substance, 47 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) at G-11 (Mar. 12, 2007) (quoting Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon). However, it strongly recommends forging a new audit
strategy that includes higher rates of audit as a form of deterrence.
145
Joyce, supra note 130, at 2 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander’s reference
to the backlash against the IRS after the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings, in which witnesses testified—
largely falsely—to abusive enforcement actions by the IRS).
146
David Schizer has drawn a similar conclusion: “In important respects, the private tax bar
outmatches their counterparts in government. This imbalance is one of sheer numbers, of access to
information, and, at least in some cases, of sophistication and expertise.” Schizer, supra note 56, at
331.
147
TIGTA, supra note 126, at 2.
148
Diane Freda, NTEU President Kelley Tells Congress More Workers Key to Reducing Tax Gap,
53 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 20, 2007).
149
IRS Oversight Board Annual Report 2007, at 9 (2008).
150
Id.
151
These discussions involved practitioners in the Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC
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seasoned tax lawyer reported that in one of the biggest partnership tax
cases of the last twenty years, the investigating revenue agent suspended
the audit for several weeks toward the end of the inquiry to attend an entrylevel partnership class. In another partnership investigation, a privatesector lawyer spent several hours trying to explain to the investigating
agents that, as the agents did understand, reduction of debt inside a
partnership is treated as a cash distribution152 (which had not been reported
as income by the partners), but there was the offsetting fact that the debt
also increased outside basis when it was first assumed by the partnership,
so the distribution was not in excess of basis after all.153 The agents
relented on this key fact and closed the case, but only after months of
resource-intensive investigation. In addition, some practitioners report that
40 to 50% of issues on tax returns get picked up by revenue agents today,
whereas of old that figure was 70 to 90%. Professor John Braithwaite has
reported a similarly dismal assessment of revenue agent competence
among elite tax lawyers. It is “not hard to get things by them,” one of
Braithwaite’s interviewee’s shared, while another opined, “[t]he real issue
is that the IRS aren’t [sic] smart enough to find these [sophisticated tax
shelter] deals on a tax return.”154
The IRS has implemented aggressive measures to reduce the resource
gap. Chief Counsel Donald Korb’s initiatives have been particularly
laudable. Korb has launched an aggressive campaign, for instance, to
return “a healthy respect for the IRS” by recruiting top legal talent to the
Service.155 To this end, Korb and his deputies have begun aggressively
recruiting at the country’s top law schools. The campaign, dubbed “Great
Place to Start” and depicted in a glossy brochure containing biographies of
tax luminaries whose legal careers began at the IRS, has been wildly
successful, with thousands of aspiring tax lawyers vying for entry-level
jobs.156
While recruiting, training, and retaining a top-notch workforce are
necessary components for closing the resource gap, they are not sufficient.
More drastic measures need to be considered by policymakers and tax
officials, including those offered by Dean David Schizer of Columbia Law
legal markets.
152
I.R.C. § 752(b) (2008).
153
Id. § 752(a).
154
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE: MARKETS IN VIRTUE 133 (2005).
155
Bennett, supra note 123.
156
As testament to the campaign’s success, the Chief Counsel’s Office received over 3000
applications from law students in both 2006 and 2007 and interviewed at more than 150 law schools in
both years, compared to 60 schools in 2005. Telephone Interview with Hsinyu Yu, Attorney
Recruitment Manager, IRS Chief Counsel Office (Jan. 30, 2008); see also Robert Guy Matthews, It’s
Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, but a New Push Betters Returns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006,
at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Sheryl Stratton, After One Year on the Job, IRS
Chief Counsel Reviews, Previews, 107 TNT 292 (Apr. 13, 2005). For the brochure, see
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/publication_4063.pdf.
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School. With respect to increasing government expertise as part of the
effort to combat overaggressive tax planning, Schizer proposes recruiting
retiring tax partners to mentor recent law school graduates entering
government work,157 adopting a generous loan forgiveness program for
these graduates,158 increasing the government pay scale to attract a small,
elite team of private sector lawyers,159 retaining the equivalent of a Delta
Force of tax academics and highly skilled practitioners for discrete,
specialized projects and litigation,160 and encouraging bar associations to
participate and assist in law reform.161
Even with the smartest, best educated, highest paid personnel, the IRS
would still be at a disadvantage. Staffing and retention are problems for
the Service, but skill level is not the primary issue. Indeed, in many
respects, the “information gap” separating tax regulators from private
sector tax lawyers is significantly wider than the resource gap. IRS
enforcement is so severely handicapped by informational asymmetries that
taxpayers can engage in abusive tax planning, accurately report
transactions associated with that planning, yet still provide the IRS no
indication of abusive activity.
Take the intermediary transaction tax shelter as an example.162 These
transactions typically involve four parties: a seller (S) who wants to sell the
stock of a target corporation (T); a promoter-controlled intermediary entity
(E); and a buyer (B) who wants to purchase the assets but not the stock of
the target. Under the terms of a pre-arranged plan, S purports to sell the
stock of T to E. E has arranged financing for the sale through a bridge
loan, which is secured by the assets of T. At the same time or shortly after
the stock sale, E purports to sell T’s assets to B. The bridge loan is repaid
from the proceeds, while any excess proceeds are retained by E as a fee for
serving as the accommodation party. As a result of the transaction, S
recognizes reduced gain due to its high basis in the stock of T; B receives
larger depreciation and amortization deductions based on the fair market
value of the assets (i.e., B’s purchase price rather than T’s basis in the
assets); and E avoids paying tax on the gain from the asset sale by
offsetting the gain with losses from the sale of inflated-basis assets.
157

Schizer, supra note 56, at 347.
Id.
Id. at 347–48.
160
Id. at 348–49, 351–52.
161
Id. at 350–51.
162
See IRS Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730; IRS Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406. I am
grateful to William Alexander for this example. The IRS has identified this scheme as a “listed
transaction,” defined as a “reportable transaction” which “is the same as, or substantially similar to, a
transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction.” I.R.C. §
6707A(c)(2) (Supp. 2000). To date, the IRS has identified thirty-two such transactions. See Listed
Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/
0,,id=120633,00.html (listing abusive tax shelters and transactions).
158
159
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As far as the IRS is concerned, S’s tax return reflects a simple sale,
while B’s reflects a straight asset purchase. The only way for the Service
to expose the scheme is to examine together the returns of all four parties.
In these transactions, paying more money to private sector attorneys and
expert academics or recruiting law students with higher grades or more
elite degrees will not uncover the tax shelter activity. In either case, the
IRS misses the abusive behavior because there is no indication that
anything is wrong. In these situations, information rather than resources
separates the government from the private sector. Ultimately, heightened
disclosure requirements and more stringent standards of tax practice,
subjects discussed in Part IV of this Article, offer a better solution to the
problem of information asymmetries.
B. Extending the Private Enforcement Model to Tax
Even if public enforcement were stepped up by enhancing government
resources, private innovation would outstrip it due to information
asymmetries. These asymmetries are difficult to overcome because
taxpayers and their advisors perceive substantial benefits to obscuring tax
shelter activity. Moreover, these benefits far exceed the discounted
probability of detection, prosecution, and punishment. Thus, to the extent
the government turns to the private sector for help in improving
compliance, it needs to provide incentives to balance the significant
economic upside of abusive tax planning. This section of the Article
discusses various incentives that flow from extending private enforcement
to tax regulation. While this recommendation may appear to be susceptible
to charges that it abdicates the essential governmental function of revenue
collection, scholars have shown that private enforcement of public law can
be a powerful monitoring and prosecutorial mechanism.163 Private
enforcement is particularly appropriate when regulators—due to
asymmetric information, active concealment by regulated parties, and
weak enforcement—are unable or unwilling to enforce the law or
prosecute offenders effectively. Current tax regulation suffers from all
three symptoms, and could benefit significantly from private enforcement
efforts.
In 2006, Congress explicitly recognized the benefits associated with
private tax enforcement. It amended the little known tax whistleblower
statute, Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section 7623, by significantly
163
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying
Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766 (2001) [hereinafter Kovacic, Private
Monitoring]; William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799 (1996); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax
Gap: Behavioral Options, 117 TAX NOTES 517 (2007); Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 205–08; Dennis
J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357 (2008).
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expanding the size of rewards paid to informants. The promise of lucrative
bounties increased incentives for private persons to expose abusive
taxpayer behavior, and added risk of detection and prosecution to the
compliance calculus.164 In addition, the 2006 amendments authorized a
new IRS Whistleblower Office165 to process tips received from informants
who “spot tax problems in their workplace, while conducting day-to-day
personal business, or anywhere else they may be encountered.”166 While
prior law capped informant awards at $2,000,000 (and at $50,000 as late as
1989167), the revamped law contains no such cap and authorizes awards
between 15 and 30% of collected proceeds, including penalties, interest,
additions to tax, and any other amounts resulting from the action.168 The
IRS launched the Whistleblower Office in February 2007, and named
Stephen Whitlock, former head of the IRS Office of Professional
Responsibility, as its first Director.169 Early indications are that the
revamped program is working as planned, with “knowledgeable insiders”
submitting bounty claims and turning over “big, fat piles of paper”
involving hundreds of millions of dollars.170 In October 2007, the
Whistleblower Office received its first $1 billion submission,171 followed
by a $2 billion submission two months later,172 and a $4.4 billion
submission in June 2008.173 At 30% of collected proceeds, that equals
potential informant awards of $300 million, $600 million, and $1.32
billion.
Congress could further embrace the private enforcement approach by
(i) enacting a private attorney general statute for tax, and (ii) authorizing
private citizens to bring qui tam lawsuits for purported tax violations.174
Under a private attorney general statute for tax, private individuals would
be authorized to make claims against other private parties for failure to pay
164

Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2958

(2006).
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Id. § 406(b).
IRS News Release IR-2007-25 (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=167542,00.html.
167
IRS Publication 733 (rev. 7-80). Congress raised the cap in 1990 to $100,000. IRS
Publication 733 (rev. 11-90).
168
I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
169
Dustin Stamper, Whitlock Tapped to Head New IRS Whistle-Blower Office, 114 TAX NOTES
628 (2007).
170
Tom Herman, Whistleblower Law Scores Early Success, Higher Rewards Attract Informants
Submitting Tips, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at D3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File
(quoting Director Whitlock).
171
J.P. Finet, Tax Whistleblower Action Claims $1 Billion Underpayment by Fortune 500
Company, 197 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (Oct. 12, 2007).
172
J.P. Finet, Whistleblower Action Claims Major Firm Underpaid Its U.S. Taxes by $2 Billion,
238 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-9 (Dec. 12, 2007).
173
Tax Whistleblower Claims $4.4 Billion Tax Underpayment by Fortune 500 Company, 115
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-4 (June 16, 2008).
174
“Qui tam” is shorthand for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipse” or “he who sues for
the king as for himself.”
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175

taxes. As with other such statutes, the idea would be to provide
incentives for private persons to bring lawsuits deemed to be in the public
interest (in this case, collection of taxes owed but not paid) and for private
sector lawyers to represent those plaintiffs. With respect to extending the
qui tam approach to tax, other federal and state whistleblower statutes,
including the wildly successful False Claims Act,176 already provide for qui
tam actions,177 which allow private individuals with knowledge of fraud
committed against the government to bring suit on the government’s
behalf. The informant presents the government with her information, and
the government decides whether to prosecute the case or allow the
informant to proceed alone as a qui tam plaintiff. Bringing the qui tam
model to tax would add additional risk associated with noncompliant
behavior. The threat of qui tam lawsuits could alter governance and
compliance norms within organizations, and deter noncompliant behavior
at the source. Moreover, the qui tam approach provides a particularly
efficient form of regulation by shifting the cost of compliance to the party
or parties with the lower cost of monitoring, i.e., employee insiders, inhouse lawyers, and outside tax counsel.178
Private enforcement of tax laws could also shrink the resource and
information gaps by aligning the interests of taxpayers, tax practitioners,
and tax regulators. Economic incentives for exposing abusive taxpayer
behavior would put taxpayers and tax advisors on the side of enforcement
and collection. Private enforcement programs could create a market for
practitioners skilled in shepherding whistleblower and qui tam plaintiffs
through the regulatory and judicial processes. Lured by the prospect of
economic gain, these practitioners and their clients would effectively act as
government deputies in protecting the revenue and rooting out abusive tax
avoidance. In fact, in the short time since Congress enacted sweeping
changes to the tax informant statute, the tax whistleblower bar has grown
perceptibly, as much as 15–20% according to the national organization of
175
Examples of private attorney general statutes include the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006), the Clean Water Act of 1972 § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000), and
the Clean Air Act of 1970 § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000).
176
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2000). In 2007, recoveries under the False Claims Act exceeded $1.4
billion. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, FRAUD STATISTICS OVERVIEW, http://www.
lopds.com/files/pdf/stats.fy2007.final.pdf.
177
As of September 1, 2008, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had enacted false
claims statutes containing qui tam provisions. Five additional states had qui tam laws that applied
exclusively to heath care fraud, while two municipalities, Chicago and New York City, had enacted
false claims ordinances with qui tam enforcement mechanisms. See Taxpayers Against Fraud
Education Fund, The False Claims Act Legal Center, State False Claims Acts,
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
178
See Kovacic, Private Monitoring, supra note 163, at 774 (“The chief virtue of private
monitoring is that it gives monitoring tasks to individuals closest to the relevant information.”). For a
fuller treatment of the tax whistleblower statute and the implications of extending qui tam to tax, see
Ventry, supra note 163.

462

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:431

179

qui tam lawyers.
The private enforcement approach reflects an agile compliance strategy
that could help the government keep up with “the capacities of
professionals advising the private sector for evasive innovation.”180 Recent
legislative enactments, particularly the anti-shelter provisions of the Jobs
Act, arm tax officials with improved anti-shelter weapons. But they attack
known transactions, while unidentified deals remain hidden. “Narrowlytailored legislative responses to particular types of shelters are . . . not
adequate as a solution to the overall shelter problem,” professors Marvin
Chirelstein and Larry Zelenak have written, because legislative fixes “are
prospective only,” and taxpayers “merely move on to new types of shelters
not yet legislated against.”181 Statutory solutions should aim to uproot
abusive activity rather than attack it post hoc. Tax authorities need a
compliance regime that will detect, deter, and effectively punish
noncompliant behavior while rewarding compliant behavior. Extending
the private enforcement model to tax and, as discussed in the next section,
increasing information sharing among taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax
officials, are essential components of such a regime.
C. Diffusing Suspicion and Creating Dialogue
At the same time we improve enforcement and align taxpayer and
government interests, we must alter IRS culture.182 The failure of the
prevailing tax compliance regime is as much attributable to deficient
compliance and enforcement norms among tax regulators as among
taxpayers and their advisors. Over the years, tax regulators have cultivated
an “Us vs. Them” mentality, whereby officials resist sharing information
with taxpayers whom they view (sometimes correctly) as resistant to
sharing information with them. The result is that each side is deeply
suspicious of the other, with concerns over process exacerbating the
suspicion.
Taxpayers complain about unresponsive administrative
procedures associated with published guidance, taxpayer-specific issue
resolution, and deficiency examinations. To their clients’ concerns, tax
advisors add complaints that disciplinary investigations of tax practitioners
conducted by the Treasury Department resemble Star Chamber
179

Telephone Interview with Jeb White, Editor, Quarterly Review, Taxpayers Against Fraud
(TAF) (July 3, 2007).
180
Simon, After Confidentiality, supra note 32, at 1460.
181
Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1939 (2005).
182
Altering organizational culture is no easy task, particularly within organizations with
entrenched institutional practices such as the IRS. For a case study on changing organizational culture
within revenue agencies, see Jenny Job et al., Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations:
From Command-and-Control to Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL’Y 84 (2007) (describing efforts to
change revenue-collecting cultures in Australia, New Zealand, and Timor Leste).
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proceedings with no procedural safeguards. Meanwhile, tax regulators are
convinced that taxpayers and their advisors thwart reporting procedures by
engaging in and failing to disclose abusive transactions. Thus, many of the
recommendations already discussed in this Article, such as rewarding
taxpayer compliance, encouraging participatory rulemaking, and enhancing
private enforcement, are designed to align the interests of tax regulators,
taxpayers, and tax advisors. Improving perceptions of procedural justice
among taxpayers and advisors can be especially effective in facilitating
compliance with tax laws.183
Sharing information could go a long way toward mitigating suspicious
minds, but only if the information flows in two directions, with taxpayers
and tax officials both realizing benefits from the exchange. Mutually
beneficial communication would provide regulators with additional
information to assess levels of compliance and to focus resources. It
would also provide taxpayers certainty and assistance in complying with
the law. Given that tax risk has become an increasingly salient factor in
board rooms,184 taxpayers are seeking more from tax regulators to assist
with compliance. According to Dave Hartnett, Director General of the
United Kingdom’s tax agency, “tax is creeping into corporate
responsibility and into the sort of thing that business leaders as opposed to
tax leaders are starting to say about tax, tax risk[,] and the support they
want from tax administrat[ors].”185 Business taxpayers can no longer
afford to treat tax as an unknown quantity. They desire more certainty in
outcome, even if that means sharing more information with tax officials.
Meanwhile, tax authorities are starting to appreciate that disclosure and
information sharing offer mutual benefits: “We want compliance with the

183
See Valerie Braithwaite, Tax System Integrity and Compliance: The Democratic Management
of the Tax System, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 28, at 271, 287 (explaining that a taxing agency
“that de-legitimizes itself in the eyes of citizens limits its effectiveness and short-changes citizens in
terms of what they can expect from democracy”); Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects
of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 50, at 259,
261 (examining the adequacy of Strümpel’s three-variable model of tax enforcement and compliance,
focusing specifically on “the effects of enforcement contacts on sanction perceptions, the perceived
fairness of tax laws, and future intentions of noncompliance”); Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and
Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in id., at 223, 227 (“Positive actions by authorities
toward taxpayers may be reciprocated by compliant actions on a simple tit-for-tat basis, a direct effect
on taxpayers’ actions that is not mediated by normative or legitimating processes.”); Leviner, supra
note 72, at 262 (noting that “the perceptions taxpayers have” of procedural fairness “affect the
legitimacy taxpayers attribute to the administration and the extent to which they accept its authority”);
John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective
Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 408–13 (1998) (examining the results of an empirical study finding
that trust in government and trust in other citizens significantly increases the likelihood of compliance
with federal income tax laws); Ronald G. Worsham, Jr., The Effect of Tax Authority Behavior on
Taxpayer Compliance: A Procedural Justice Approach, 18 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 19 (1996)
(determining that perceived procedural injustice adversely affects taxpayer compliance).
184
See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text.
185
Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 35 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
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tax laws,” an IRS official recently told a roomful of practitioners. “You
need a level of certainty, so do we.”187
Reciprocal information sharing can produce mutual benefits even
when opposing parties disclose otherwise proprietary information. At the
annual Tax Council Policy Institute (TCPI) symposium in 2007, British tax
officials discussed their experience with comparing risk assessments of
aggressive tax positions prepared by taxpayers with those prepared by the
government. The comparison revealed that each side shared similar
assessments of each other’s litigating positions, a realization that generated
trust and respect.188 During a later panel at the same symposium,
moderator and tax lawyer Armando Gomez engaged IRS Chief Counsel
Donald Korb on the issue of reciprocal information sharing and on viewing
risk assessments as “a useful tool for getting both sides closer to an
agreement on what the right outcome is.”189 Korb dismissed the idea as
“just silly,” and suggested that information sharing should be a one-way
street with taxpayers disclosing information and the government receiving
it.190
While Korb has done a great deal during his tenure to facilitate
communication between taxpayers and the government, his position at the
TCPI conference undermines the principles of cooperative tax regulation.
If tax authorities expect taxpayers and tax advisors to adopt a more
transparent approach to tax compliance, they have to play by the same set
of rules and be willing to alter their own compliance norms. In the words
of Director General Hartnett, tax administrators have to “pause
occasionally and say to ourselves, am I too close to the immediate issues
and is there a bigger goal here and something bigger I can achieve if I start
approaching tax in a different way?”191 The “mantra” for tax officials,
therefore, should be “transparency, disclosure, and cooperation” flowing in
both directions.192 One-way information flows, from taxpayer to tax
official, only exacerbate suspicion, distrust, and noncompliance.
Suspicion and distrust also currently surround the appeals process.
Tax practitioners have long questioned whether they really get a “fresh
look” when the IRS Office of Appeals examines a challenged position.
For their part, tax officials insist that appeals remain independent of agency
policy or published guidance. But recent actions by IRS officials belie the
186

Richard R. Jones et al., Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements: The FASB, SEC and IRS
Current Perspective and Future Plan, reprinted in 85 TAXES, June 2007, at 66 (remarks of Deborah
Nolan).
187
Id.
188
Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 39 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
189
Armando Gomez et al., Global Tax Enforcement Trends and Worldwide Risks, reprinted in 85
TAXES, June 2007, at 73 (remarks of Armando Gomez).
190
Id. (remarks of Donald Korb).
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Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 42 (remarks of Dave Hartnett).
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Id. at 33.
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purported independence, indicating that while Appeals is committed to an
independent review of each and every tax question, it is also beginning to
conform more closely to official IRS interpretations of the law.193
Practitioners rightly wonder, “How can Appeals remain independent and
‘get with the program’ at the same time?”194 In fact, why even have an
appeals process if it merely restates the official views of the Chief
Counsel’s office or of published guidance? Of course, appeals officers
cannot adopt positions on statutory interpretation contrary to official IRS
policy, but that does not prevent them from acknowledging contrary
authority or distinguishing the taxpayer’s case from previous
interpretations. If the IRS is serious about the perception and application
of procedural fairness, it needs to embrace the idea of an independent
Appeals Office.195
To break down still further its adversarial image, the IRS could involve
taxpayers and their advisors more directly in regulatory processes. This
effort should involve tax officials sitting down with taxpayers and their
advisors to discuss and resolve tax positions before the taxpayer files a
return. The IRS has rolled out several pre-filing initiatives, including the
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) program, the Industry Issue Resolution
(IIR) program, the Pre-Filing Agreement (PFA) program, and the
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP).196 In the event taxpayers find
193
See Dustin Stamper, Appeals Needs to Be “On Same Page” as Rest of IRS, Brown Says, 2007
TAX NOTES TODAY 54-2 (Mar. 19, 2007), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (“IRS Deputy
Commissioner of Services and Enforcement Kevin Brown assured practitioners at a March 19 meeting
of the Tax Executives Institute that the IRS is committed to the Office of Appeals’ independence, but
he said he wants Appeals to conform more closely to IRS interpretations of the law.”).
194
Allen Kenney, IRS Wades Into Murky Waters: Appeals’ Independence, 114 TAX NOTES 1201,
1201 (2007) (quoting former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams).
195
In a recent ABA Section of Taxation survey, tax practitioners gave the Appeals process mixed
reviews. The survey found overall satisfaction of sixty percent, but an even higher percentage
expressed the opinion that recent changes to the appeals process negatively affected the office’s
independence. For example, nearly eighty percent of respondents believed the office’s involvement in
recent IRS tax shelter settlement initiatives made the Appeals Office appear less independent.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, SURVEY REPORT ON INDEPENDENCE OF IRS
APPEALS 1–2 (2007).
196
The first two programs are specific to particular industries, with the APA designed to resolve
actual or potential transfer pricing disputes for cross-border transactions “in a principled and
cooperative manner,” Rev. Proc. 2006-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, while the IIR identifies disputed issues
common to taxpayers in a particular industry, and seeks to resolve them through published guidance
rather than post-filing examination. Rev. Proc. 2003-36, 2003-18 I.R.C. 859. Meanwhile, the PFA and
CAP programs, though not specific to any particular industry or issue, serve a growing population of
business taxpayers. Under the PFA, business taxpayers are allowed to request consideration of a
specific issue prior to filing a return, a process that provides certainty of outcome and expedites the
resolution of potential future disputes. Rev. Proc. 2007-17, 2007-4 I.R.B. 368. CAP, meanwhile,
requires “extensive cooperation” between the government and participating taxpayers, with taxpayers
fully disclosing information concerning completed transactions and proposed reporting positions in
exchange for full resolution of all material tax issues prior to filing a tax return, in addition to the
guarantee that they will not be subject to post-filing examinations for returns filed consistent with the
agreed upon resolutions. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1144. Taxpayers are taking
advantage of these programs in increasing numbers. Participation in the CAP program, for instance,
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themselves subject to examination by the IRS, the Fast Track Settlement
(FTS) program offers a streamlined dispute resolution process.197
Together, the pre-filing and dispute resolution programs offer taxpayers
and advisors the opportunity to participate directly in the resolution of tax
issues. Moreover, they provide taxpayers and the government increased
certainty of outcome as well as lower costs.198 Timely, reliable, and
participatory guidance enlists taxpayers and their advisors in tax
enforcement, and discourages impermissible planning activity by offering
tangible incentives for choosing compliance over avoidance.
An open dialogue between taxpayers, practitioners, and tax authorities
is crucial to forging a shared understanding of what it means to comply
with the law. Absent such dialogue, the parties “may have different and
genuinely held understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider
theirs the correct and clear meaning.”199 Moreover, as Valerie Braithwaite
has observed, whether or not a taxpayer “does what is asked of him or her
is not always visible. Furthermore, whether or not a person interprets the
request in accordance with its intent is sometimes far from certain.”200
Active communication between the parties can identify a shared
compliance norm, and clarify what is expected of each participant.
One particularly effective way to facilitate communication between
taxpayers, advisors, and regulators is to involve all parties in the
rulemaking process. In fact, in early 2007, the IRS launched a program to
solicit public comments earlier in the guidance process.201 Though
politicians initially criticized the program as giving private industry too
much influence over regulatory functions,202 Chief Counsel Korb reported
has jumped 429% in the last three years. John Herzfeld, LMSB Personnel Changes Will Not Alter
Division Focus on Certainty, Schott Says, 197 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-11 (Oct. 12, 2007)
(reporting an increase in participating taxpayers from 17 in 2005 to 73 in 2007). Meanwhile, a
PricewaterhouseCoopers survey found that 51% of tax professionals surveyed had obtained or were in
the process of obtaining an advance pricing agreement. FIN 48 Work Paper Fears Surface in
PricewaterhouseCoopers U.S. Poll, 247 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Dec. 27, 2007).
Notwithstanding the success of these programs, high user fees may be dampening greater participation.
Lauren Gardner, Requests for PFA Program Down Since $40,000 Application Fee Spike, 100 DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA), at G-2 (May 23, 2008) (discussing PFA user fee increase in 2007 from $10,000 to
$50,000); Molly Moses, Ratio of Completed APAs on Par with 2006; IRS Creates Spreadsheet for
CPM Analysis, 60 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-2 (Mar. 28, 2008) (reporting that increase in APA user
fee from $25,000 to $50,000 is hurting participation).
197
Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1044; Announcement 2006-61, 2006-36 I.R.B. 390. The
program provides a review of the dispute by the IRS Office of Appeals, which allows all parties
(including taxpayers, advisors, revenue agents) to participate in the resolution process. Id.
198
See John Herzfeld, Korb Renews Warning Against Reliance on Protection of So-Called Wall
Street Rule, 196 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-7 (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Chief Counsel Korb on the
compliance benefits of pre-filing resolution and the associated certainty for taxpayers and the
government).
199
Sol Picciotto, Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State,
29 LAW & POL’Y 11, 12 (2007).
200
Braithwaite, supra note 183, at 276.
201
IRS Notice 2007-17, 2007-12 I.R.B. 748 (2007).
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Legislators recoiled upon learning of the program, calling it a classic case of the fox guarding
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in late 2007 that the process had “worked beautifully,” thereby quieting
concerns on Capitol Hill.203 The initiative allows the government to “meet
the demands of the taxpaying public for more technical guidance” when
constrained by “a finite amount of resources,”204 while also opening to the
light of day a previously insulated process. Affected taxpayers, bar
associations, and trade groups routinely comment on published notices of
proposed rulemaking, and many of these groups meet privately with
Treasury officials on matters important to their constituents.205
Recognizing that interest group lobbying had become an entrenched aspect
of public lawmaking, and that business knowledge and experience,
particularly in the tax field, are critical for government officials, the IRS
added transparency to a process otherwise hidden from public view.
Soliciting comments earlier creates a collaborative, participatory, and
informed system. In addition to facilitating communication, the program
helps regulators overcome distrust and suspicion by working alongside
taxpayers, incorporating their concerns into legal rules, and investing them
professionally and personally in compliance.
At their heart, policies that facilitate participatory rulemaking,
information sharing, and pre-filing resolution challenge the historically
adversarial tax regulatory environment. As we will see in Part IV, the tax
professional associations—particularly the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA)—have contributed mightily to this adversarial atmosphere. The
ABA’s official ethical guidelines pertaining to tax practice characterize the
IRS as an “adversary party rather than a judicial tribunal” or even a “quasijudicial institution.”206 They further assume that the act of filing a tax
return (an act that the taxpayer controls and that merely reports the
taxpayer’s financial transactions for the year) will result in a
Even ABA guidelines pertaining to marketed tax
controversy.207
shelters—guidelines that were designed explicitly to encourage lawyers to
the chicken coop. “We don’t need K Street lawyers writing enforcement regulations to help their
clients create tax shelters,” one legislator proclaimed, while another feared that “outside groups” might
“skew the IRS’s view,” particularly if special interests wrote the first draft of guidance upon which all
subsequent drafts depended. Diane Freda, Top Senate Finance Panel Members Assail IRS Plan to Let
Outsiders Develop Guidance, 51 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Mar. 16, 2007).
203
Dustin Stamper, Korb Laments Penalty Pileup, Vows More Practitioner-Driven Guidance, 117
TAX NOTES 421, 421 (Oct. 29, 2007).
204
Stephen Joyce, Korb Defends Proposed Guidance Process as Transparent Method of Aiding
Taxpayers, 47 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Mar. 12, 2007).
205
Stamper, supra note 203, at 421 (quoting Korb as saying, “Let’s not kid ourselves, this has
been going on forever where people come in and give us proposed ideas—often in secret”).
206
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
207
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 warns, without explanation, that “in many cases a lawyer must
realistically anticipate that the filing of a tax return may be the first step in a process that may result in
an adversarial relationship between the client and the IRS.” ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op.
85-352 (1985) [hereinafter Formal Op. 85-352].

468

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:431

cooperate in the crackdown on abusive tax shelters in the early 1980s—
restate an adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the IRS with
respect to tax shelter opinions issued to taxpayer-clients.208 Achieving an
open, transparent, and reciprocal tax regulatory environment requires
altering the rules under which tax practitioners plan transactions and advise
clients.
IV. ELEVATING PRACTICE STANDARDS AND HEIGHTENING
DISCLOSURE RULES
A. The Failure of Self-Regulation
In 1980, the IRS reported that abusive tax avoidance was threatening
to destroy the tax system. Tax shelters were shunting billions of dollars
from the government, overloading the court system,209 and creating a tax
administration problem “of major proportions.”210 Nearly 200,000
individual tax returns representing 18,000 shelter schemes clogged the IRS
examination and appeals process.211 These returns, IRS Commissioner
Jerome Kurtz said, involved almost $5 billion “in questionable
deductions.”212 “The great abuse we are finding in this area,” Kurtz
warned, “could result in a serious decline in taxpayers’ perception of the
fairness and evenhandedness of our administration of the tax system and
consequently in the level of voluntary compliance.”213 The Treasury
Department’s General Counsel expressed similar fears, stating that the
“widespread nature” of tax shelters “undermines the public’s confidence in
the fairness of the tax system,” and ultimately “may affect the level of
208

ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 346 (1982). For a fuller discussion of Opinion 346,
see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty Regime, 111 TAX
NOTES 1269 (2006).
209
Tax shelter litigation accounted for more of the increase in caseload for the U.S. Tax Court
than any other kind of controversy. Between 1980 and late 1982, tax shelter cases tripled from 5000 to
over 15,000, comprising nearly one-third of the entire docket. New York State Bar Association Tax
Section, Managing the Tax Court Docket, 85 TNT 146-93 (July 24, 1985).
210
Jerome Kurtz, Kurtz on “Abusive Tax Shelters,” 10 TAX NOTES 213, 213 (1980). Beginning
in the 1970s, tax shelter promoters began peddling tax-favored investments for high-income individuals
involving the leveraged purchase through partnerships of tax-preferred assets such as real estate or oil
and gas tax shelters. These transactions were effectively shut down in the 1980s by a combination of
legislative fixes—primarily the passive loss rules, see I.R.C. § 469 (2000), and at-risk rules, see id. §
465—falling inflation, and general tax reform that curtailed tax preferences and lowered rates. Despite
these legislative fixes, and largely due to the ingenuity of tax lawyers, new sheltering techniques
involving complex financial transactions and aggressive arbitrage were soon available to high-income
taxpayers and corporations. Unlike the individual tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, there was no
magic legislative bullet to undercut the modern tax shelter transaction. The tax shelter marketplace of
the 1990s and 2000s was a different creature altogether, in terms of complexity, dollars lost to the
federal treasury, and tax advisors playing loose with the rules.
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Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213; see also Editor, Little Consensus on IRS Advisory Group, 5 TAX
NOTES 2 (1977) (discussing the backlog of shelter cases at the examination stage).
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Kurtz, supra note 210, at 213.
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Id.
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214

voluntary compliance.”
The Treasury Department felt that tax lawyers were complicit in the
proliferation of tax shelters. In particular, the lawyer’s written legal
opinion legitimized questionable schemes and provided penalty protection
for taxpayer-clients.215 Attacking tax shelters meant attacking the legal
opinions, which, in turn, meant attacking the opinion writers, who owed “a
particular responsibility to Treasury.”216 Through opinion writing, tax
attorneys “control[led] access to the market place.”217 By virtue of that
power and “the privileged position given the attorney by our system of law
and government,” the tax lawyer shouldered professional obligations that
extended beyond blind client fidelity.218
The government set about reminding tax practitioners of their multiple
responsibilities. By offering amendments in 1980 to Circular 230,219 the
federal regulations governing standards of tax practice, the Treasury
Department raised the ethical bar on tax practitioners, deputizing them
(largely involuntarily) in the fight against abusive tax shelters.220 The 1980
amendments, in combination with subsequent amendments issued in
1986,221 1992,222 2000,223 2001,224 and 2003,225 raised due diligence
requirements for practitioners writing legal opinions; prohibited opinions
214
Robert H. Mundheim, Mundheim on “Abusive Tax Shelters,” 10 TAX NOTES 213, 213 (1980);
see also James B. Lewis, The Treasury’s Latest Attack on Tax Shelters, 11 TAX NOTES 723, 723 (1980)
(noting that tax shelters produce “impairment to the fairness of the income tax, the perception of
unfairness by the rest of the taxpaying public, and the feared adverse impact on the level and temper of
voluntary compliance”).
215
Mundheim, supra note 214, at 213–14 (noting that “the tax opinion is viewed as fraud
insurance” whereby the investor “is protected against loss” from penalties for underpayment of tax).
216
Jerome Kurtz, Professional Opinions as “Tickets to the Audit Lottery,” 12 TAX NOTES 262,
262 (1981).
217
Mundheim, supra note 214, at 214.
218
Id.
219
31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2007). Circular 230 regulations govern tax practice “in front of the IRS,”
which is read broadly to include all written tax advice, from planning to litigation.
220
See Tax Shelters: Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, 58,594–
95 (proposed Sept. 4, 1980) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing the Practice of
Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal
Revenue Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,719, 6,722 (Feb. 23, 1984) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
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See Tax Practitioners, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113 (proposed Aug. 14, 1986) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
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See Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,360
(proposed Oct. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
223
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendments to the Standards of Practice Governing Tax
Shelters and Other General Matters, 65 Fed. Reg. 30, 375 (May 11, 2000).
224
See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,276,
3,294–96 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing Practice
Before the Internal Revenue Service, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,760, 48,771, 48,774 (July 26, 2002) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
225
See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186,
75,189–90 (proposed Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); Regulations Governing
Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839, 75,844 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
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that failed to reach a “more likely than not” conclusion that the reporting
position would prevail if it were challenged and litigated by the
government; defined broadly what constituted a prohibited “tax shelter”;
and imposed significant disciplinary penalties on practitioners and their
firms—including monetary sanctions, public censure, suspension from
practice, and even disbarment—for failing to meet the federal practice
standards.
The Treasury Department called out the professional associations,
particularly the ABA and AICPA, for ineffectually regulating the
misconduct of their members. The abject failure of self-regulation was
evident in the thriving tax shelter market, and the associations’ abysmally
low ethical standards contributed directly to the creation, marketing, and
advising of overaggressive transactions. When the Treasury Department
first issued proposed regulations to Circular 230, the ABA’s prevailing
ethical guidelines allowed a practitioner to advise a client to take
advantage of a transaction so long as the practitioner believed in good faith
there was a “reasonable basis” for the transaction, even though she may
have also believed that the transaction would be challenged, litigated, and
disallowed.226 A transaction that had a reasonable basis of being sustained
on the merits was widely recognized to have a 10–20% likelihood of
success.227 Critics characterized it as “noncompliance with scienter”228 and
“anything you can articulate without laughing.”229 Furthermore, the
standard was used to support “any colorable claim,”230 and it facilitated a
race to the bottom among tax practitioners such that “[t]he one with the
least conscience gets the best result.”231
To this day, the ABA recognizes the debased reasonable basis standard
as a satisfactory level of confidence when advising a client with respect to
tax controversy representation, as well as negotiation and settlement
proceedings. When advising tax reporting positions, the ABA requires a
slightly higher level of confidence—“realistic possibility of success”—
which allows the lawyer to advise a position so long as she believes in
good faith the advice possesses a 33% likelihood of success.232 This is the
226

ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 206.
See Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the “Authorities”: Determining Valid Legal Authority in
Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072,
1128 (1988); J. Timothy Philipps et al., What Part of RPOS Don’t You Understand?: An Update and
Survey of Standards for Tax Return Positions, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1163, 1193 (1994).
228
John André LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit
Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 365 (1983).
229
Lee A. Sheppard, Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed at ABA Meeting, 22 TAX
NOTES 757, 757 (1984) (quoting law professor Bernard Wolfman).
230
BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX
PRACTICE: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 59 (1992).
231
Commissioner Jerome Kurtz and Panel, Discussion on “Questionable Positions,” 32 TAX
LAW. 13, 24 (1978) (remarks of Commissioner Kurtz).
232
Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 207. For interpretation of the reasonable possibility of success
227
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233

same standard used by the AICPA.
It effectively means that tax
practitioners can advise taxpayer clients on transactions and reporting
positions that they believe, if discovered, challenged, and litigated, possess
a one in three possibility of being sustained on the merits.
These phenomenally low ethical guidelines encourage a “catch-me-ifyou-can” mentality that subverts statutory purpose and Congressional
intent. If we are serious about reducing abusive tax avoidance, we must
elevate practice standards. As importantly, we must not leave to the
professional associations the responsibility of articulating appropriate
standards and ethical guidelines. Historically, these organizations have
promulgated rules benefiting their members’ interests while undermining
the integrity of the tax system. Self-regulation has failed. The history of
tax shelters in the United States implicates the professional associations
and their depraved practice standards as culprits in aggressive taxpayer
behavior, tax avoidance, creative noncompliance, and even evasion.234
Though the ABA and AICPA have historically been resistant to the
government imposing practice standards on its respective membership,235
Congress and the Treasury Department have forced elevated practice
standards and ethical guidelines on a reluctant practitioner community.
Congress and Treasury continue to press for additional reforms.
Having succeeded in applying the more likely than not standard to written
standard, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (2008); Banoff, supra note 227, at 1128; Philipps et al., supra
note 227, at 1193.
233
AICPA Federal Taxation Executive Committee, Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice
(SRTP), No. 1, Tax Return Positions (rev. 1988).
234
For a discussion of this history from the 1970s to the 1990s, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Raising
the Ethical Bar for Tax Lawyers: Why We Need Circular 230, 111 TAX NOTES 823 (2006); Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., Tax Shelter Opinions Threatened the Tax System in the 1970s, 111 TAX NOTES 947 (2006);
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Reasonable Basis and Ethical Standards Before 1980, 111 TAX NOTES 1047
(2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Reaction to the 1980 Proposed Amendments to Circular 230, 111
TAX NOTES 1141 (2006); Ventry, supra note 208; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., No Joke: Circular 230 Is Here
To Stay, 111 TAX NOTES 1409 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Lowering the Bar: ABA Formal Opinion
85-352, 112 TAX NOTES 69 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Filling the Ethical Void: Treasury’s 1986
Circular 230 Proposal, 112 TAX NOTES 691 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Vices and Virtues of an
Objective Reporting Standard, 112 TAX NOTES 1085 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., IRS Penalty Report:
A Call for Objective Standards, 112 TAX NOTES 1183 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Politics and
the New Substantial Understatement Penalty, 113 TAX NOTES 98 (2006).
235
With each government incursion into regulating tax practice standards, the professional
organizations have reacted as if the sky were falling. In 1980, after the Treasury Department issued
amendments to Circular 230, the New York State Bar Association stated that the government’s attempt
to regulate practice standards was inherently dangerous and a threat to “our heritage of freedom.” New
York State Bar Association Tax Section, Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter
Opinions, 12 TAX NOTES 251, 259 (1981). In addition, a future chair of the ABA Section of Taxation
expressed an opinion shared by the ABA that heightened reporting requirements created “a chilling
effect on advocacy.” Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX LAW. 5, 44
(1980). The Treasury’s more recent amendments to Circular 230 generated a similar reaction. See
infra notes 293–97 and accompanying text. But see Rostain, supra note 55, at 81 (finding a “nuanced
conception of professionalism” among elite corporate lawyers and the tax bar supporting reforms in
reporting standards).
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236

opinions under Circular 230,
Congress passed legislation in 2007
imposing the same standard on tax return preparers under the Code’s
penalty provisions.237 Under prior law, the Code merely required
practitioners to reach a “realistic possibility of success” determination
before advising a taxpayer on undisclosed (non-shelter) positions or
Under new law, practitioners must demonstrate a
transactions.238
“reasonable belief” that the tax treatment of an undisclosed position would
more likely than not be sustained on its merits before advising the
position.239 For disclosed positions, preparers must show a “reasonable
basis” for the position (rather than prior law’s “non-frivolous” standard,
corresponding to a lowly 5–10% chance of success).240 To address
practitioner concerns pertaining to the implementation of the new standard,
Treasury issued transitional relief applying prior law to returns filed for tax
year 2007.241 Moreover, it has continued to evaluate ways to align the
standard for preparers with that for taxpayers, the latter of which currently
requires taxpayers to meet a lower threshold—“substantial authority”—for
reporting a position on a tax return, a level of certainty ranging between 40
and 51%.242 The higher standard for tax practitioners compared to
taxpayers “has caused much angst for accountants and attorneys.”243 In
particular, practitioners have complained about a potential conflict of
interest vis-à-vis taxpayer clients, as well as greater costs for taxpayers,
practitioners, and the government.244
236

See supra note 219.
Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246, 121 Stat. 200,
(2007); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560 (June 17, 2008) [hereinafter Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95].
238
IRS Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282.
239
Id.
240
Id. A practitioner possesses a “reasonable belief” that the position would more likely than not
be sustained on the merits if she analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities in the manner described in
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2008) and, in reliance upon that analysis, “reasonably concludes in good
faith that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if
challenged by the IRS.” IRS Notice 2008-13, supra note 238, at *13–14. “Reasonable basis” under the
new law is interpreted in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3), the threshold for which reflects
“a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not
patently improper. The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely
arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.” Id.
241
IRS Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 12; IRS Notice 2008-11, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279.
242
Alison Bennett, Desmond Discusses Range of Issues Under New Preparer Penalty Standards,
234 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-11 (Dec. 6, 2007). For the taxpayer understatement penalty and
substantial authority requirement, see I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES,
CHAPTER 8 (1989), at 43 (substantial authority “should approach” 51% but could extend as low as
45%); Philipps, et al., supra note 227, at 1193 (“around 40%”). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2)
(2008) (providing an even wider range in defining the substantial authority standard as “less stringent
than the more likely than not standard [i.e., 51%] . . . but more stringent than the reasonable basis
standard [i.e., 10–20%]”).
243
Diane Freda, Webcast Highlights Questions on Guidance on Tax Preparer Standards, 10
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-4 (Jan. 16, 2008).
244
See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Recent and Proposed Statutory Changes to
237
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Though practitioners had hoped that Treasury would equalize the
standards by lowering the tax preparer standard to “substantial
authority,”245 Treasury appears committed to the higher, more likely than
not standard for practitioners.246 This commitment indicates that to the
extent Treasury equalizes the standards, it will raise the threshold for
taxpayers rather than lower the threshold for practitioners. A more likely
than not requirement for both taxpayers and tax practitioners would
encourage taxpayers and their advisors to work together to locate the most
likely “correct” answer for return positions. In this way, the more likely
than not standard would reinforce the familiar jurat on the Form 1040
requiring a taxpayer to attest “[u]nder penalties of perjury” that she has
examined her return, and to the best of her “knowledge and belief it is true,
correct, and complete.” If the affidavit is to have any meaning—indeed, if
“true, correct, and complete” is to have any meaning—it must mean that
the taxpayer believes that an asserted position will be adjudged “correct” at
least half the time.247 In addition, a more likely than not standard forces
practitioners to reject “literalist interpretations that break the connection
between language and underlying purpose” of the tax law.248
In addition to reinforcing a purposive approach to statutory
interpretation, a more likely than not standard would augment principles of
reciprocity, taxpayer-government interaction, and regulatory transparency.
If a practitioner and her client wish to assert a position that fails to meet the
more likely than not standard, perhaps one they believe in good faith
reinforces the purpose of the statute, they should be able to do so as long as
they disclose it on the return. Predicting whether a reporting position will
prevail if litigated contains inherent uncertainties, particularly when courts
can rely on language of the statute, purpose of the transaction, legislative
intent, or any combination of the three. Disclosure provides a legitimate
option for taxpayers wanting to test or clarify a law or assert a nonTax Return Preparer Penalty Rules of Internal Revenue Code Section 6694 and Related Issues,
available at 18 TAXCORE (BNA) (Jan. 19, 2008) (urging adoption of substantial authority standard
rather than more likely than not standard to unify preparer and taxpayer standards and to avoid conflicts
of interest); American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Comments on Changes to Standards for
Imposition of Certain Penalties, available at 222 TAXCORE (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2007) (discussing
increased burdens, conflict of interest, and preference for substantial authority over more likely than
not); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement Submitted to Senate Finance
Committee, Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure (2007) (arguing that
the higher reporting standard would impose “an unworkable burden for the entire tax system” by
prompting excessive disclosure).
245
Id.
246
See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 6694–95, 73 Fed. Reg. 34, 564.
247
The same can be said of I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000), which makes it a felony for an individual to
“willfully” make and subscribe to a tax return which she does not believe “to be true and correct as to
every material matter.” See Calvin Johnson, “True and Correct”: Standards for Tax Return
Reporting,” 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (1989).
248
Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 639 (2006).
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frivolous but weak position. Additionally, taxpayers could seek pre-filing
resolution of uncertain positions from the IRS. To the extent taxpayers
prefer review by the courts rather than the Service, Congress or Treasury
could institute expedited refund claim procedures whereby taxpayers could
report and pay tax liability based on the more likely than not standard, and
simultaneously file a refund claim requesting immediate administrative
denial of the claim to facilitate judicial review.249
It is important to acknowledge that a more likely than not standard
would not necessarily eliminate abusive behavior. First, nearly all of the
legal opinions that propped up the most notorious tax shelters of the 1990s
and 2000s concluded that the underlying transactions were at least more
likely than not correct.250 Elevated standards would not have deterred the
creation and marketing of these transactions. Second, raising the required
level of certainty to more likely than not—or even “should” or “will”—
would do nothing to alter the behavior of tax lawyers who conceive of their
role as legal advisors to include only a duty to inform clients of potential
penalties associated with positions falling below statutory requirements.251
Third, heightened reporting standards would not stop lawyers from orally
advising overaggressive positions, a form of advice not currently covered
by Treasury regulations pertaining to written opinions.252 In fact, oral
advice can circumvent any standard, particularly given the difficulties of
249

Id. at 642.
See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a legal opinion
concluding that a BLIPS [Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure] transaction was more likely than not
valid); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
(involving a legal opinion from a different law firm concluding that a BLIPS transaction was more
likely than not valid); Hoehn Family LLC v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 07-0069, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23422 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 2007) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a FLIP
transaction [Foreign Leverage Investment Program] was more likely than not valid); Denney v. Jenkens
& Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (involving a legal opinion concluding that a COBRA
[Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives] transaction was more likely than not valid).
251
Imagine the following scenario: A client comes to her tax advisor with a transaction that relies
on a literal reading of the statute and that reflects a confidence level of 25% chance of success. How
should the tax lawyer advise that client? Many attorneys would respond that all that is required is to
predict how the IRS or the courts will react to the transaction. Under this view, it is not the role of the
lawyer to say “yes” or “no” to the transaction based on the lawyer’s personal views of the morality of
the deal, the purpose of the statute, or what will happen to the tax system if the transaction works. It is
the lawyer’s role to review with the client all statutory and non-statutory requirements of the law. But
beyond that, the lawyer is merely required to inform the client of the likelihood that the transaction will
be upheld if challenged, as well as the likelihood of penalties if it is challenged and not upheld. At that
point, the lawyer has fully complied with all applicable ethical and professional duties, and the client
can decide for herself if she wants to engage in the transaction and how she wants to report it. The
tougher scenario involves the lawyer developing the 25% likelihood of success transaction herself and
subsequently peddling it to her client. Even then, many lawyers would condone such behavior so long
as the lawyer fully disclosed the risks associated with the transaction.
252
See infra note 253. Conversations with practitioners in New York, Los Angeles, and
Washington, DC, revealed that some tax lawyers have responded to the more likely than not standard
for certain written opinions by issuing advice orally, supplemented by internal memoranda used as
talking points with clients, the latter of which are considered privileged and therefore neither
disclosable nor discoverable absent client waiver.
250
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policing advice without a paper trail and with the protective shield of
privilege.
Notwithstanding these limitations, a more likely than not standard
would assist in transforming compliance norms. If we remain concerned
about the above loopholes (that is, a limited duty for attorneys and the shift
to oral advice not covered by current opinion standards), we might
consider extending the heightened standard to oral as well as written
advice, and eliminating privilege and work-product protection from prereturn tax planning.253 Even absent such reforms, a more likely than not
reporting standard would discourage literal interpretations of the law in so
far as such analyses would lack sufficient authority beyond statutory
language.
If policymakers were reluctant to apply the more likely than not
standard to areas outside tax law, they might consider extending a radical
reform currently taking place within tax law. In August 2005, the
Department of Justice entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with
KPMG as part of its multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud investigation
involving abusive tax shelters.254 The signed agreement is a remarkable
document, and imposes permanent restrictions on KPMG’s tax practice,
including requiring the firm to: cease (with limited exceptions) its private
253

See Beale, supra note 248, at 644–68 (arguing for eliminating privilege and work-product
protection from pre-return tax planning). The subject of attorney-client and work-product protection
has received considerable attention of late in the tax world. The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) has reinterpreted how tax practitioners should account for uncertainty in income taxes on
financial statements. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES 1 (2006). The FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires
companies to conduct detailed issue-by-issue analyses of all tax positions, an inquiry that generates
documents and disclosures tracking legal analysis of tax advisors on a company’s transactions. Id. at
32. These documents, in turn, may become integrated into the tax accrual workpapers of a company’s
auditors who review them before signing off on financial statements. Under longstanding Supreme
Court precedent, if the documents become part of the auditor’s workpapers, they are no longer
privileged and therefore subject to disclosure to the IRS. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805, 815–17 (1984) (finding tax accrual workpapers not privileged if requested under IRS
summons power provided in I.R.C. § 7602). Practitioners have expressed concern that disclosure of
internal evaluations pertaining to uncertain tax positions waives protection of the evaluations to future
discovery requests, and provides tax officials with a heretofore protected roadmap for locating and
challenging soft spots in a taxpayer’s return. See Tom Jaworski & Allen Kenney, PCAOB Officials
Discuss Tax Accrual Workpapers, FIN 48, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-6 (Mar. 12, 2007), available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Fred F. Murray, FASB and IRS Working on FIN 48 Implementation,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at J-1 (Mar. 15, 2007). Recently, a federal court in Rhode Island and another
in Alabama refused to enforce IRS summonses by finding tax accrual workpapers privileged under the
work-product doctrine. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.R.I. 2007); Regions Fin.
Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8,
2008). The government has appealed both cases. For a critique of the cases and a discussion of their
adverse implications on tax enforcement, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance,
120 TAX NOTES 857 (2008).
254
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, KPMG DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 1 (2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov.usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf [hereinafter DPA]; IRS News
Release IR-2205-83 (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom.article.0,,id=
146999,00.html.

476

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:431

client tax practice as well as its compensation and benefits practice; refrain
from developing, marketing, selling, or implementing pre-packaged tax
products; and restrict severely its tax preparation services.255
More importantly, the deferred prosecution agreement requires KPMG
to apply significantly elevated standards to its tax practice. Rather than the
otherwise prevailing more likely than not standard, the agreement requires
KPMG to meet a “should” standard for all “covered opinions,”256 as well
as for tax return preparation involving “principal purpose”257 or “listed”258
transactions. These elevated standards apply to transactions involving all
taxpayer-clients, including individuals, private enterprises, and public
corporations. Moreover, the agreement mandates that KPMG adhere to
elevated standards when providing covered opinions for individuals and
private entities on non-controversial transactions (“should” rather than
“more likely than not”) and when providing tax return preparation on all
other transactions (“more likely than not ” rather than “realistic possibility
of success”).259 Only when advising large private entities and public
corporations on non-controversial transactions and run-of-the-mill tax
return preparation may KPMG follow the same standards as other
practitioners.260 While firms have not rushed to adopt similarly high
standards, there has been no observable, adverse impact on KPMG’s tax
practice associated with the heightened requirements.
B. Disclosure Rules for Increased Transparency and Certainty
Practice standards by themselves will not alter practitioner behavior.
To animate the standards and to change behavior, tax officials must have at
their disposal some way to determine if practitioners are complying with
the heightened requirements. Stricter disclosure rules provide the window
through which the government can monitor tax practitioner and taxpayer
behavior. As part of the deferred prosecution agreement discussed above,
KPMG agreed to oversight for three years by an “independent monitor”
that, among other things, will ensure that KPMG is acting in accordance
with the agreement.261 At the end of the monitor’s term, the IRS will
255

DPA, supra note 254, at 4–5.
Covered opinions include: listed transactions, see supra note 162, or a substantially similar
transaction, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2007); a transaction, the principal purpose of which is the
avoidance of tax, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B); or a transaction, a significant purpose of which is the
avoidance of tax, if the opinion is either a reliance opinion, a marketed opinion, an opinion subject to
conditions of confidentiality, or an opinion subject to contractual protection, id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).
257
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii)(C) (2005) (defining principal purpose as any plan or
arrangement designed to avoid or evade federal income tax such that the motive to avoid or evade
exceeds any other motivation).
258
See supra note 162.
259
DPA, supra note 254, at 7.
260
Id.
261
See id. at 18.
256
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oversee KPMG’s “compliance with the restrictions and elevated standards”
for an additional two years.262 The monitoring can be thought of as an
extreme form of mandatory disclosure.
Disclosure, in and of itself, can be a good thing.263 It helps the
government identify prohibited or potentially prohibited behavior.
Disclosure also alters norms by adding risk to a taxpayer’s evaluation of
whether and how to comply with the law. Disclosure provides a
particularly effective incentive in the presence of low audit rates, where
taxpayers otherwise evaluate risks with little concern that their reporting
position will be seen by the government. In fact, disclosure can alter
compliance norms not only with respect to plainly prohibited or probably
prohibited transactions, but also with respect to probably permissible
transactions, particularly if the government might designate those
transactions as prohibited in the future.264 Of course, there is such a thing
as too much disclosure, where the government cannot process the
information or the taxpayer is overburdened by the requirements.265
However, so long as the advantages of disclosure (e.g., altering wasteful
planning and avoidance behavior) exceed the disadvantages (e.g.,
overburdening the government or the taxpayer), disclosure requirements
should be included in any tax compliance strategy.
The combination of elevated practice standards and heightened
disclosure rules can shift compliance norms. Prevailing standards based on
adversarial norms encourage literalist interpretations of the law because
such interpretations can provide sufficient authority if challenged and
litigated. Meanwhile, practice standards based on a more likely than not
norm reinforce a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. With
elevated standards, practitioners have to do more than simply rely on
statutory language to support a position, particularly in the presence of
262

Id. at 25.
See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 69–70
(2001) (stating that to combat “what amounts to audit lottery and to nip schemes in the bud, airtight,
focused, prompt and efficient disclosure rules are required”); Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax
Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1060 n.96 (2007) (disclosure can alter
taxpayer norms, “[e]ven with a low risk of audit”). But see David A. Weisbach, The Failure of
Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 73–78 (2001) (arguing that disclosure will
not curb abusive behavior, and may even worsen it by producing continual changes to substantive law
around which lawyers could plan).
264
This is basically Dan Shaviro’s point respecting the new category of reportable deals,
“transactions of interest.” See supra note 107. According to Shaviro, requiring disclosure of these
transactions is “important and valuable” for several reasons, including “the prospect that a deal not
currently required to be disclosed may subsequently become so,” which, in turn, “may serve as a
socially valuable deterrent when taxpayers are contemplating in questionable newly designed
transactions.” Shaviro, supra note 115, at 33.
265
See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Disclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285342 (arguing that mandatory
disclosure rules can result in opportunistic overdisclosure that could hamper anti-shelter efforts).
263
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heightened disclosure requirements. They have to examine additional
sources of statutory interpretation (such as legislative intent and public
purpose), and they have to evaluate how individual statutes interact with
other statutes, as well as how that interaction might reinforce or destroy the
underlying purpose of the statutes in combination with each other.
Heightened disclosure rules under a more likely than not standard in
the tax context should be viewed as part of a larger trend toward greater
corporate transparency. Within the last several years, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (Sarbanes-Oxley) has subjected corporations to significantly stricter
Sarbanes-Oxley also
disclosure rules266 and internal controls.267
established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate
the auditors of public companies and to conduct independent investigations
and disciplinary proceedings of public accounting violations.268 Other
recent changes to federal securities law require registered companies to
provide “material historical and prospective textual disclosure”269 relevant
to an understanding of its financial condition.270 In addition, the IRS has
rolled out new Schedule M-3 as part of the corporate tax return to help the
IRS find relevant information (assuming all cash is accounted for properly
on the return) by reconciling a corporation’s financial accounting income
(i.e., “book income”) with its taxable income (i.e., “tax income”).271
Finally, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has instituted
significant changes to how companies account for uncertainty in income
taxes recognized on financial statements. FASB Interpretation No. 48
(FIN 48) clarifies the treatment of unrealized income tax benefits and
liabilities on financial statements by requiring domestic public companies
to assess whether their tax positions are more likely than not correct and to
reflect the results of that assessment in financial disclosures.272 If a
taxpayer determines that a position meets or exceeds the more likely than
not standard, it can report the tax benefit without setting aside
corresponding reserves; if not, it must provide adequate reserves to cover
266
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 204, §§ 406–07, 116 Stat. 745; Disclosure
Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 3447,235, 79 SEC Docket 1077 (Jan. 24, 2003).
267
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006); Management’s Reports on
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,986, 80 SEC Docket 1014 (June 5, 2003).
268
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (establishing the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board and outlining its duties).
269
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations;
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,831, 43 SEC Docket 1330
(May 18, 1989).
270
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2008).
271
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DRAFT OF SCHEDULE M-3 (FORM 1120-F), NET INCOME (LOSS)
RECONCILIATION FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS WITH REPORTABLE ASSETS OF $10 MILLION OR MORE
(2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/f1120fm3--dft.pdf.
272
See supra note 253.
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the contingency. According to the IRS, FIN 48 increases transparency,
assists the government in distinguishing between compliant and
noncompliant taxpayers, and provides corporate taxpayers greater certainty
with respect to tax reporting positions.273
All these reporting regimes share the same goal of enhanced
transparency. Regulated parties possess information that the government
wants, but they are reluctant to turn over the information without good
reason. Indeed, turning over the information typically puts a party at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis other parties. Heightened disclosure rules provide
“good reason” to report relevant information, while elevated practice
standards provide the framework to evaluate one’s responsibilities under
the rules. The last Part of this Article continues this discussion by
examining the regulatory tradeoffs between rules versus standards in
facilitating compliance, and by evaluating the government’s recent
attempts to regulate the behavior of tax practitioners through a combination
of the two approaches.
V. RULES VS. STANDARDS AND THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TAX
PRACTITIONERS
A. Rules vs. Standards and Cooperative Regulation
As tax regulators continue to work with tax professionals and
taxpayers to improve compliance, the government needs at its disposal a
judicious mix of rules and standards. Rules provide certainty of outcome
and lower compliance costs, and enhance due process and fair treatment.
Standards, for their part, breathe life into rules, adding context, intent, and
purpose to text and language. In other words, standards provide coherence
to a bunch of otherwise independent rules by giving them an overarching
purpose. Reliance on rules alone would require that legislators, regulators,
and legislative drafters possess a crystal ball to predict all potential uses
and abuses of each and every tax provision, both in isolation and in
combination with each other.274 Even if policymakers were somehow
273

See, e.g., Weinberger et al., supra note 79, at 60–61 (remarks of Deborah Nolan, viewing FIN
48 disclosures as part of an “environment of increased transparency,” and stating that FIN 48
“increases the corporate taxpayer’s need for certainty, where we might be able to provide a service.
And from a practical standpoint, it could provide us with additional information and data for our risk
assessment tools as well”).
274
Given the infinite transactional permutations for tax planning, relying on rules alone would be
futile and even irresponsible. See David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance
Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 33 (2006) (“No government can foresee, let alone draft,
rules that produce the ‘right’ tax results under every conceivable permutation of facts that can be
constructed by taxpayers in an increasingly complex financial world.”); see also Stanley S. Surrey,
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 707 n.31 (1969) (writing that standards reduce complexity, and “save the tax
system from the far greater proliferation of detail that would be necessary if the tax avoider could
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equipped with the power to see into the future, reliance on rules alone
would yield an unduly complex and distortive regime. Standards by
themselves are not the solution either. The flexibility of standards can be a
virtue in assisting regulators and courts in responding to unpredictable
taxpayer behavior. But such flexibility can also produce increased
uncertainty, higher compliance costs, and behavioral distortions.
Moreover, standards run the risk of producing a one-way street in favor of
the government, with tax authorities administering and enforcing the law
with wide and arbitrary discretion. Also, depending on the regulatory
culture and whether practitioners have the wrong attitude about what they
are supposed to do for clients, standards can encourage literalist
interpretations of the law as much as bright-line rules. In fact, bright-line
rules may reflect an effort on behalf of regulators to stop abuses of more
ambiguous standards.
Coordinated use of comprehensible rules and anti-abuse standards
holds the promise of achieving optimal tax compliance with lower costs for
taxpayers, tax regulators, and the tax system.275 A balanced compliment of
rules and standards allows tax authorities to enunciate general principles
and goals underlying the rules, and to rely on tax professionals and
taxpayers to implement and fulfill those goals. Recently, courts have
scrutinized tax practitioners’ alleged compliance with legal rules in light of
underlying standards, both with respect to applicable ethical standards as
well as common law doctrines such as economic substance, business
purpose, and substance over form.276 Complying with the literal terms of a
statute or other legal rule was not necessarily enough in these cases; courts
required practitioners to show compliance with the purpose of statutory
language and respect for the coherence of the system.
Without standards to overlay rules, tax planning would run amok.
Bright-line rules encourage literalist interpretations of the law and a
myopic focus on form over substance. Faced with a bright-line rule, some
tax advisors view it as their job to obscure and expand the line.277 The
“ultimate question” in tax practice, law professor James Eustice has noted,
is “where ‘the line’ is between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable
succeed merely by bringing his scheme within the literal language of substantive provisions written to
govern the everyday world”).
275
For a general discussion of rules and standards in tax law, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 586–96 (1992), and David A. Weisbach,
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 CHI. L. REV. 860, 863–77 (1999).
276
See supra note 250; see also infra note 289 for respresentative cases, and infra note 287 for the
common law doctrines.
277
See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 238
(1999) (stating that some lawyers’ “reverence for our objective method of determining tax liabilities
approaches something like religious fervor (or more cynically, they recognize that results based to the
maximum extent on the unadulterated application of objective rules tend to aggrandize both the power
and the pocketbook of the tax practitioner)”).

2008]

COOPERATIVE TAX REGULATION

481

overreaching, and, equally important, how clear that line should be.”278
Tax shelters, practitioner-scholar Peter Canellos has said, though perhaps
on the legal side of the line, “almost always ignor[e] the underlying
purpose of the law.”279 Standards provide a check on unadulterated tax
reduction, and they offer the government, courts, and aggrieved taxpayers
powerful weapons to wield against overreaching practitioners.
In recent years, the government has balanced rules with standards in its
effort to improve compliance. As we have seen, the new rules include an
enhanced statutory penalty regime and heightened disclosure
requirements.280 With respect to standards, the government has adopted
various anti-abuse rules and ethical guidelines to highlight the coherence of
an otherwise independent set of rules. The anti-abuse “rules” operate more
like standards. Typically promulgated by regulation but occasionally
embedded directly in a statute, they override otherwise applicable legal
rules when taxpayers enter into aggressive tax avoidance transactions
deemed to violate the purposes of the statute or regulation. A transaction
can run afoul of an anti-abuse rule even if it otherwise complies with
statutory language. The use of such rules covers an increasing number of
transactions, including the tax treatment of partnerships,281 consolidated
returns,282 debt instruments,283 interest-rate, equity and commodity
swaps,284 and net operating loss limitations.285 Essentially, the various
anti-abuse rules reflect the spirit of common law doctrines that look to the
overarching effect and purpose of a transaction rather than whether a
taxpayer complied formulaically with the letter of the law. The anti-abuse
rules for partnerships, for example, provide that if a partnership “is formed
or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which
is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners’ aggregate
federal tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent” of the
partnership provisions, the government “can recast the transaction for
federal tax purposes.”286 The anti-abuse rules parse the difference between
the letter of the law and its spirit.
Anti-abuse rules also reflect explicit application of longstanding
judicial doctrines that adopt a purposive rather than a literalist
interpretation of the tax law. The most commonly known doctrines include
economic substance, business purpose, sham transaction, and substance
278

James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L.
REV. 135, 136 (2002).
279
Canellos, supra note 263, at 52.
280
See supra Part IV.
281
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2008).
282
Id. § 1.1502-95.
283
Id. § 1.1275-2.
284
Id. § 1.446-3.
285
Id. § 1.172-3.
286
Id. § 1.701-2(b).
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over form.
The economic substance doctrine has been a particularly
effective tool in the fight against tax shelters and reflects an amalgam of
the other common law doctrines. At its core, it represents a judicial effort
“to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax
code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality
simply to reap a tax benefit.”288 In a stunning series of recent victories for
the government, judges have wielded the economic substance doctrine to
invalidate abusive transactions.289 Though courts acknowledge that
taxpayers possess “an unquestioned right to decrease or avoid . . . taxes by
means which the law permits,”290 they also perceive “a material difference
between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to provide a tax
benefit (which is legitimate), and creating a transaction, without a business
purpose, in order to create a tax benefit (which is illegitimate).”291 The
anti-abuse rules and judicial doctrines are designed to help taxpayers and
tax regulators discern the real from the unreal, and thereby deter abusive
tax avoidance behavior.
B. An Enforceable Normative Standard
The Treasury Department regulations governing tax practice also
attempt to assist taxpayers and tax officials in discerning real from unreal
transactions. To this end, the regulations employ a combination of
elevated practice standards and strict disclosure rules that produce an
enforceable normative standard.292 This standard, backed by the threat of
287
For discussions of these doctrines, see Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality:
Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU. L. REV. 9 (2001); Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose
Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU. L. REV. 149 (2001); Joseph Bankman, The Economic
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Canellos, supra note 263; Hariton, supra note 274;
Hariton, supra note 277; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress,
118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008).
288
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007).
289
See, e.g., BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Cemco Investors, LLC
v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2006); Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1340; Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir.
2006); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), reconsideration denied, 81 Fed. Cl.
173 (2008); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007);
H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007).
290
Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 45. This sentiment is captured most famously in the oft-quoted
line from Gregory v. Helvering: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The next line from the opinion is just as
famous, though primarily due to its omission by pro-taxpayer courts and commentators: “But the
question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which
the statute intended.” Id.
291
Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1357.
292
See Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1197, 1236–37 (2003) (concluding that an enforceable normative standard is needed to
discourage abusive tax planning); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in
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palpable sanctions, discourages abusive tax avoidance, while encouraging
tax practitioners to adopt non-literal statutory interpretations and to make
themselves aware of the public purposes underlying the tax laws.
The new Circular 230 rules impose significant responsibilities on tax
practitioners. When the Treasury Department proposed its most recent
amendments to tax practice standards, practitioners freaked out.
Accountants Burgess and William Raby, the latter a former chair of the
AICPA’s Federal Tax Division, warned that tax practitioners and their
clients were helplessly “caught up in a paradigm shift” that could alter tax
practice as we know it.293 Practitioner “hue and cry”294 further charged that
the new rules covering legal opinions and other written advice were
“irrational” and “impediments to practice.”295 They would “drive a wedge
between taxpayer and professional advisor,” lead to “intimidation tactics,”
dramatically increase the cost of tax advice, and push clients to
disreputable practitioners.296 Taxpayers, tax advisors, tax officials, and the
tax system would all be better off if Treasury simply “thr[e]w in the
towel,” and abandoned its twenty-five year effort to regulate tax shelters by
regulating tax professionals.297
Practitioners may have overreacted to the new regulations, but they
were right about one thing: the new rules had everything to do with
regulating noncompliance by regulating practitioners.
There are
shortcomings to this strategy, to be sure, and tax officials need to recognize
the “intrinsic limits of practitioner regulation in controlling the behavior of
clients.”298 Tax practitioners cannot change the hearts of taxpayers nor, for
that matter, their desire for lower taxes. But tax practitioners do have a
responsibility to lead clients, particularly if a client’s normative standards
threaten the coherence of the system and the underlying purpose of the tax
laws. At some point, the practitioner must “stop being a tax advisor and
become a professional,”299 obliged to follow a moral compass that asks
more of her than morals articulated in positive legal rules.
If we are uncomfortable or unconvinced by such moral injunctions, the
the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 590 (2003) (writing that there has been a
“true erosion in the professionalism of the tax bar”).
293
Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Penalty Protection for the Taxpayer: Circular 230
and the Code, 107 TAX NOTES 1257, 1257 (2005).
294
Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and Start Over,
110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1318 (2006).
295
Sheryl Stratton, Tax Officials Spar with Tax Bar over Circular 230, 107 TAX NOTES 1082,
1082–83 (2005) (quoting practitioners).
296
Dan W. Holbrook, Imagine the Worst the U.S. Treasury Could Do to Us—They’ve Done It:
Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law Practice, 41 TENN. B.J. 28, 30 (2005).
297
Schenk, supra note 294, at 1311.
298
Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1030
(1987).
299
George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax
Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1581 (1980).
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less overtly moral trappings of economic theory can lead us to similar
conclusions. Modern economic thought holds that it is appropriate for
regulators to shift the cost of compliance to the party or parties with the
lower cost of monitoring.300 If the social value of the noncompliant
activity is low, moreover, the socially optimal penalty for engaging in
noncompliance can be quite large. In the realm of tax compliance,
practitioners are undoubtedly in better positions to detect and deter
noncompliance at lower cost than taxpayers or tax officials. They are “the
first line of defense” against overaggressive tax avoidance.301 It is
therefore appropriate to shift the cost of compliance to practitioners and to
regulate their behavior with an enforceable normative standard as a way to
regulate the behavior of taxpayers.302 It is also appropriate to impose
severe, socially optimal penalties on their noncompliant behavior, at least
insofar as we believe advising aggressive tax avoidance schemes contains
little or no social value.
The new federal rules regulating tax practice are far from perfect. In
some respects, they are overbroad, sweeping in plainly uncontroversial tax
advice.303 The prevailing regime, in an attempt to improve transparency,
also imposes unnecessary costs and inefficiencies on practitioners and
clients, by, among other things, requiring practitioners to “prominently
disclose” in all written advice that such advice cannot be used for purposes
of avoiding penalties.304 This requirement has resulted in the ubiquitous
“no-penalty reliance” legend that practitioners now routinely append to
every written communication, not just official client communications and
300
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1974) (concluding that private enforcement of
public laws can be more efficient than public enforcement).
301
Tom Gilroy, IRS Chief Counsel Calls Practitioners “First Line of Defense” Against Fraud,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-3 (Oct. 25, 2006) (quoting IRS Chief Counsel Korb).
302
Recent changes to securities law also shift the cost of compliance to practitioners on the theory
that insiders, particularly lawyer-insiders, are well-positioned to identify, address, and remedy legal
violations. For instance, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires lawyers representing issuer
clients in any capacity to “report up” evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation within the issuer corporation to the chief legal counsel or CEO. 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). Moreover, it permits lawyers to “report out” such evidence in the event the
corporate entity does not stop, prevent, or remedy the alleged wrongdoing. Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,276 (Jan. 29, 2003).
303
See, e.g., David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
843 (2006); Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 TAX
NOTES 915, 918–19 (2005) (arguing that Circular 230, created “for the purpose of attacking tax
shelters,” heavily regulates “normal day-to-day tax practice”). It is worth noting that the government
could easily focus the rules on abusive tax avoidance by requiring practitioners to “opt in” rather than
“opt out” of the current system; that is, to affirm in writing when a legal opinion can be used by the
taxpayer for penalty protection rather than affirming, as currently required, when an opinion cannot be
used for penalty protection.
304
31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).
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305

work product.
If tax regulators wanted to enhance transparency in the
current tax marketplace, they could ask taxpayers and their advisors to
disclose what the government really wants: the opinion itself rather than
information about certain transactions contained within the opinion.306
What better way to enlist practitioners’ help in reducing noncompliance
than requiring them to come clean on the kind of transactions they believe
to be authorized, or they believe should be authorized, under the tax laws?
Although overbroad in important but not insoluble respects, the
disclosure rules contained in Circular 230 move us toward cooperative tax
regulation. With respect to legal opinions, Circular 230 requires that all
covered opinions307 failing to reach a confidence level of “more likely than
not” regarding one or more tax issues must include “appropriate
disclosures.”308 Circular 230 further specifies that such disclosures must
state “prominently” that the opinion does not in fact reach a conclusion at a
confidence level of at least more likely than not, and that the opinion
cannot be used by the taxpayer for purposes of avoiding tax underpayment
penalties. In other words, if a practitioner cannot conclude at a confidence
level of at least more likely than not, then she must disclose that lack of
confidence, both to the taxpayer and to the government. This approach
encourages an honest, interactive approach to tax regulation that turns
taxpayers and tax practitioners into stakeholders, partners in the legislative
and regulatory effort to buttress tax compliance.
C. Assessing Compliance Risks Under the New Rules
The federal enforceable normative standard governing tax practice
alters the cost-benefit analysis associated with noncompliance. In 2004,
Congress authorized monetary penalties against practitioners and firms for
Circular 230 violations.309 The IRS may impose penalties either in
addition to or in lieu of other sanctions that may be levied by the Service,
305

An exemplary no-penalty reliance legend reads:
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed
by the IRS, we inform you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication
(including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be
used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or
(ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any matters addressed
herein.
Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 E-Mails, T-Shirts Attain “Legendary” Status, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY
127-1. For a discussion of the costs associated with the no-penalty reliance legend, see id.
306
See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions,
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 353–54 (2002) (arguing that not requiring
counsel to disclose its opinion about a full transaction “may seriously hurt the Service in its ability to
discover and attack tax shelter transactions”). Requiring disclosure of opinions would have to
overcome the same kind of privilege and work-product concerns discussed supra note 253.
307
For a definition of “covered opinion,” see supra note 256.
308
31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3).
309
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(a)(1), 118 Stat. 1418, 1586.
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including censure, suspension, or disbarment.
It will also post on the
IRS website final agency disciplinary decisions pertaining to individual
practitioners.311 The head of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) has said that the agency is not going after mere “foot faults,”312 but
rather misconduct “out of the mainstream”313 by “really bad actors,”314
those “who put a blemish on the industry.”315 Indeed, according to
Michael Chesman, OPR Director, the IRS wants not only to “get the bad
apples,”316 but also “to protect the practitioners and the public who are
behaving ethically.”317 The sanctions will be used “only in extraordinary
instances when traditional penalties may not appropriately punish
violators,”318 and will be focused on “fitness to practice, not punish.”319
Despite these assurances, practitioner groups remain wary of the
government’s “powerful new weapon to deter prohibited conduct.”320
They desire more certainty of what will and what will not be considered
violations subject to monetary sanction, particularly because penalties
could exceed fees collected on a transaction.321 Practitioners are also wary
of the process surrounding disciplinary proceedings conducted by the OPR
that precede the imposition of sanctions. Though these proceedings are
largely consistent with disciplinary procedures under ABA Model Rules
310

31 C.F.R. § 10.50.
Tax Decisions & Rulings: OPR Posting Final Disciplinary Decisions for Circular 230
Violations on IRS Website, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at K-1 (June 19, 2008); see also IRS
Announcement 2008-52, 2008-22 I.R.B. 1040 (announcing disciplinary sanctions for violations of
Circular 230); IRS Announcement 2008-50, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1024 (stating that the Office of
Professional Responsibility will now publish a list of specific Circular 230 violations).
312
Steve Burkholder, Ex-IRS Official Says Agency “Won War” on Shelters, Has “Fallen Short”
on Tax Gap, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Oct. 11, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman, Director, IRS
Office of Professional Responsbility).
313
Diane Freda, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility Looking for Conduct Outside
Mainstream, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Nov. 2, 2007) (quoting Brinton Warren, special counsel
in IRS Office of Chief Counsel).
314
Diane Freda, Office of Professional Responsibility Seeks Bad Actors, Not Technical Errors,
IRS Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 17, 2007) (quoting unnamed Internal Revenue
officials).
315
Burkholder, supra note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman).
316
Alison Bennett, OPR to Focus Sanctions on “Bad Apples,” Work Toward More Transparency
in 2008, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Jan. 9, 2008) (quoting Michael Chesman).
317
Id.
318
Stephen Joyce, IRS Will Infrequently Impose Cash Penalties Due to Circular 230 Violations,
Whitlock Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-1 (Jan. 8, 2007) (quoting Stephen Whitlock, Acting
Director, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility).
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Kathleen David, Whitlock Says Practice, Not Punishment, Focus of Professional
Responsibility Office, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (Oct. 26, 2006) (paraphrasing Stephen
Whitlock).
320
New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Comments on New Monetary
Penalty Under Circular 230, TAXCORE (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2007).
321
See, e.g., ABA Section of Taxation, ABA Tax Section Comments on Notice 2007-39, on
Application of Monetary Penalties in Disciplinary Procedure Under Section 822 of Jobs Act, TAXCORE
(BNA) (Oct. 9, 2007); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Comments on Notice
2007-39 Regarding Monetary Penalties, Regulations Under Circular 230 on Tax Practice TAXCORE
(BNA) (Aug. 29, 2007).
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and state bar associations, they are unlike bar disciplinary proceedings in
which the charging body and the body conducting the trial are distinct.
The OPR performs both functions, a procedure that frightens practitioners
who have come to expect lax enforcement of ethical guidelines by
professional associations reluctant to discipline members.322
The OPR—prosecutor, judge, and jury in these proceedings—must be
mindful of practitioner anxieties concerning the system’s procedural
fairness. If the federal ethical guidelines governing tax practice are to
achieve the normative force envisioned in this Article, tax regulators must
not abuse their disciplinary powers. Rather, they must impose the same
kind of cooperative model on disciplinary proceedings as on procedures
associated with guidance, rulemaking, and investigations. The message
has to be one of cooperation rather than intimidation, a message that the
IRS is keen in sending. Director Chesman has emphasized: “We want to
be open, transparent, and a real partner in making sure there are high
standards of ethics in the profession.”323
In addition to providing the government a process for disciplining
wayward practitioners while protecting the interests of ethical practitioners
and taxpayers, the new federal rules governing tax practice unify diverse
standards among different groups of tax professionals.324 Officially, the
new regulations govern representation of taxpayers “before the Internal
Revenue Service.”325 This group is distinctly interdisciplinary, and
includes lawyers, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and
enrolled actuaries.326 The different professional organizations representing
each group of practitioners maintain their own ethical standards.
Furthermore, among attorneys, individual state bar associations interpret
the standards promulgated by the national association differently. By
322
For practitioner fears of OPR acting as prosecutor, judge, and jury, see Kathleen David, IRS
Officials Discuss Pending Guidance on Practice Issues, Including Circular 230, DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA), at G-6 (Oct. 26, 2006); Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Monetary Penalty Guidance
Due Out Soon, IRS Officials Say, 114 TAX NOTES 407 (2007). For historically lax enforcement by
professional organizations of ethical violations, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak
of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1121 (1996) (finding that disciplinary boards “are notoriously
underfunded and . . . unable or reluctant to mount the effort needed to do battle with wealthy class
action lawyers and powerful members of the defense bar”). Practitioner-scholar Michael Schler has
observed that tax lawyers are not “unduly concerned about [the] threat” of being referred to a state
disciplinary board, which is “designed to protect the client, not the Service.” Schler, supra note 306, at
366. With respect to tax shelter advice running afoul of Circular 230 standards, Schler notes that the
client “has received exactly what it paid for, namely an opinion that provides penalty protection.” Id.
323
Burkholder, supra note 312, at G-1 (quoting Michael Chesman); see also Bennett, supra note
316, at G-1 (quoting Chesman as saying, “[w]e will be working to make this office more transparent,
and answer questions of how we operate and what we do”).
324
See James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 210 (1985) (calling Circular 230 “essential if the Secretary is
to regulate practice effectively before the Internal Revenue Service because of the interdisciplinary
nature of that practice”).
325
31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2007).
326
Id. § 10.3.
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offering a uniform set of practice and ethical guidelines that are
disciplinary rather than merely aspirational, Circular 230 imposes
coherence on the otherwise incoherent world of tax practice. Moreover,
although a minority of commentators interprets the reach of the federal
regulations narrowly to capture only direct communications with the
IRS,327 the consensus is that the rules govern all written tax advice, from
planning to litigation.328 More importantly, tax officials are prepared to
apply the regulations broadly. Director Chesman has indicated that the
OPR will be “very aggressive” in using monetary penalties against
practitioners who engage in prohibited conduct under Circular 230,329 and
that it will be “an activist office, a standard bearer for ethical behavior.”330
Practitioners have responded affirmatively to their new ethical
responsibilities. Preliminary evidence indicates that shifting some of the
costs of tax compliance to practitioners is working as planned. According
to KPMG’s Tax Governance Institute, 60% of surveyed companies
reported that tax risk was a greater priority for corporate leadership in 2007
than in 2006.331 In addition, Ernst & Young’s annual Tax Risk Services
survey revealed that corporate tax departments are spending less time on
tax planning and proprietary tax strategies, while devoting more time to
complying with recent changes to the tax law and financial reporting
requirements.332 Respondents to Ernst & Young’s worldwide survey
reported that 9% of tax departments’ time was allocated to tax financial
reporting matters in 2004 compared to 23% in 2006, a jump of more than
150%, and that tax departments spent 40% less time on strategic tax
planning in 2006 than in 2004.
These trends in resource allocation away from planning and toward
compliance will likely continue as investors demand more information
about taxes from corporate executives. “Fully 70 percent of companies
surveyed in the Americas, are reporting increasing demands for more and
327
See, e.g., Arthur L. Bailey & Alexis A. MacIvor, New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict
Standards for Tax Practitioners, 57 TAX EXECUTIVE 28, 36 (2005) (noting some commentators suggest
Circular 230 does not apply to attorneys who fail to file a power of attorney to practice before the
Service).
328
See Beale, supra note 248, at 618 & n.122 (writing that notwithstanding technical arguments to
the contrary, practitioners recognize the broad reach of Circular 230 “because of the potential relevance
of any opinion to a tax controversy,” an event that gets you “before the Service”); James P. Holden,
Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 82 TAX NOTES 707, 710–11 (1999)
(criticizing the weak, “technical” argument that “some tax opinions would not be covered because
Circular 230 does not explicitly include tax advice to taxpayers”).
329
Martha Kessler, IRS Office of Professional Responsibility to Be Aggressive on Penalties,
Director Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-2 (May 8, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman).
330
Kathleen David, “Zealous” Representation Not Reason for Disciplinary Action, Chesman
Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-5 (May 16, 2007) (quoting Michael Chesman).
331
See http://www.taxgovernanceinstitute.com.
332
Stephen Joyce, Accounting Firms Increase Resources to Meet Reporting Requirements, Survey
Says, 235 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at G-9 (Dec. 7, 2006).
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better information on tax.” In addition, the government has made it clear
to practitioners that notwithstanding strides in compliance, it expects them
“to do more to protect the integrity of the system.”334 In January 2007, IRS
Commissioner Mark Everson admonished the ABA’s Section of Taxation
for its complicity in tax shelter activity during the 1990s and early 2000s,
stating that he was “not satisfied” with the recent turnaround.335 “You can
do better,” Everson urged, “[w]e need to keep working on this.”336
VI. CONCLUSION
In February 2008, the government won yet another court decision
involving abusive tax avoidance.337 In a stinging rebuke to the taxpayer’s
position, the Seventh Circuit found that the transaction in question—which
generated a $3.6 million tax loss from an investment in which the taxpayer
had $6,000 at risk—bestowed unwarranted tax benefits on both the
taxpayer and the shelter organizer, “the sort of thing that the Internal
Revenue Service frowns on.”338 The court detailed how the shelter
organizer, disgraced tax lawyer Paul Daugerdas, issued opinion letters
while at Jenkens & Gilchrist that “led to the firm’s demise,” and which
forced it to pay out more than $75 million in penalties.339 Though perhaps
lacking the style of the Seventh Circuit, other federal courts have reacted
just as negatively to abusive tax avoidance.340 Government victories in
2006 included four appellate court wins,341 which preceded three favorable
district court decisions in 2007,342 two victories in the Court of Federal
333
Press Release, KPMG, Business Struggles with Worldwide Wave of Tax Regulation, Says
KPMG International (May 17, 2007) (on file with author).
334
Sheryl Stratton, Everson to Tax Bar: You Should Do More, 114 TAX NOTES 404, 404 (2007)
(paraphrasing IRS Commissioner Everson’s comments to the tax bar at a plenary session of the
American Bar Assocation Section of Taxation meeting).
335
Id.
336
Id.; see also Gilroy, supra note 301 (quoting Chief Counsel Korb as urging tax practitioners to
“self-police” and to help the IRS encourage “self assessment” to protect the integrity of the tax system).
337
Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
338
Id. at 751.
339
Id. at 750.
340
In one case, however, the Court of Federal Claims invalidated a tax shelter purchased by H.J.
Heinz Co. in a style similar to that of the Seventh Circuit. The court quipped:
A Heinz promotion from the late 1950s and early 1960s touted its tomato
ketchup by stating—“It’s Red Magic Time!” But no amount of magic, red or
otherwise, can hide the meat of the transactions in question, the connective
tissues and gristle of which have been revealed by the multi-tined substanceover-form doctrine.
Sans sa sauce, it becomes plain that plaintiffs’
transaction simply was not “the thing which the statute intended.
H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
341
TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); Black & Decker Corp. v.
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Claims, and two U.S. Supreme Court denials of certiorari.
In 2008,
the government has continued to pile up wins with three circuit court
victories345 and three favorable district court decisions.346
Indeed, the government has been on a serious roll. The legislative and
regulatory attack on tax shelters has ignited the anti-shelter mood of the
judiciary, which now more than ever scrutinizes tax practice standards and
statutory penalties when analyzing challenged transactions. It has even
motivated the ABA to review and update its official position on written tax
shelter opinions.347 Despite the indisputable anti-shelter momentum, it is
premature to conclude, as some observers have, that “[t]he tax shelter war
is over. The government won.”348 The government’s fight against abusive
tax avoidance has been episodic. In the not so distant past, courts dealt the
government a series of tax shelter losses that followed on the heels of
seemingly momentous victories.349 Moreover, though we now point to
certain cases as seminal anti-shelter wins, we should not forget that the
government lost those cases in the lower courts,350 losses that underscore
the contingent nature of the fight against abusive noncompliance.351
Ill. Mar. 27, 2007), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 2007); BB&T Corp. v. United States, No. 1:04-CV-00941, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 321 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).
343
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2008); Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
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Rather than declare victory over tax avoidance, we would do well to
continue strengthening the existing tax compliance regime. To this end,
this Article has offered a combination of reforms to move the current
regime further from a failed command-and-control approach to one that
emphasizes cooperation, information sharing, and interest convergence.
Currently, U.S. tax regulation relies too heavily on sticks and not enough
on carrots. While recognizing that taxpayers will comply with the law in
the presence of effective deterrence and enforcement, this Article
optimizes the use of penalties as a compliance instrument by, among other
things, rewarding compliant taxpayers, engaging taxpayers and their
advisors in a participatory process, and employing cognitive devices that
portray payment of taxes as a bonus rather than nonpayment of taxes as a
penalty.
Even with optimal penalties, tax officials cannot currently enforce the
law effectively due to severe resource and information asymmetries. To
overcome these crippling shortcomings, the government must improve
funding, recruiting, training, and retention. It must also partner with
taxpayers and tax practitioners to strengthen detection, enforcement, and
prosecution of abusive tax avoidance. If successfully implemented,
cooperative tax regulation can accomplish a cultural shift not only in
taxpaying, but also in tax advising and tax administration. It can produce a
regulatory environment of collaboration rather than adversity, ex ante
resolution rather than ex post controversy, and certainty rather than
secrecy. Ultimately, cooperative tax regulation can forge a shared
understanding among taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the government of
what it means to comply with the law.

coincidence, much like baseball teams on a streak that is merely a property of
statistics rather than a change in ball playing skills. Although not literally
independent like a coin flip, the analogy is close enough: If we flip enough coins,
we are likely eventually to get 10 heads in a row. It may seem like the heads are
on a streak, but the odds on each flip have not changed. The apparent advantage
for heads and for the government is a result of selective vision.
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 228–29 (2002)
(footnote omitted).

